

# PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS

A RETROSPECT AND OUTLOOK

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SCHURMAN









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A RETROSPECT AND OUTLOOK

AN ADDRESS

BY


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This address, though somewhat curtailed, was delivered before the members of Cornell University on the morning of Founder's Day, January 11th. It was repeated, in substance, before the Reform Club of Boston on the evening of January 20th.



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## CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTORY . . . . .	1
DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS . . . . .	5
THE QUESTIONS OF IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE AND AN AMERICAN PROTECTORATE FOR THE FILIPINOS	18
PLAN OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES . . .	28
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES . .	49
THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES . . . . .	81

## INDEPENDENCE FOR THE FILIPINOS.

*“The Philippine Islands, even the most patriotic [Filipinos] declare, cannot at the present time stand alone. They need the tutelage and protection of the United States. But they need it in order that in due time they may, in their opinion, become self-governing and independent. For it would be a misrepresentation of facts not to report that ultimate independence—independence after an undefined period of American training—is the aspiration and goal of the intelligent Filipinos who to-day so strenuously oppose the suggestion of independence at the present time.”—Report of the First Philippine Commission, Vol. I., Part IV., Chapter II., p. 83.*

# PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS

## A RETROSPECT AND OUTLOOK

### INTRODUCTORY.

*Ladies and Gentlemen:*

It is now just three years ago since I was summoned to Washington, and, to my great astonishment, invited by President McKinley to accept the presidency of a commission he proposed to send to the Philippine Islands. The treaty under which this oriental archipelago had been brought under American sovereignty was not yet ratified by the Senate; but its ratification was assured, if not before, at least after the fourth of March, when the membership of the Senate would undergo a change favorable to the administration. In view of this consummation—I mean the ratification of the treaty—President McKinley desired to have a body of civil advisers—a kind of local cabinet—in the Philippines.

I need not say that I felt highly honored by the gracious proposal of President McKinley. Such a mark of confidence would have been very complimentary under any circumstances, but my sense of the honor which the President had in mind was deepened by the circum-



stance that it came absolutely unsought; indeed, I had no knowledge or intimation that the President was contemplating the despatch of a commission to the Philippines.

The President discussed with me the names of a number of hypothetical colleagues, and, having volunteered assurances in that regard which I should scarcely have presumed to solicit, he desired to know whether I would accept the presidency of the Commission. I replied that I feared it would be difficult, perhaps impracticable, for me to get away from Cornell University, and that in any event I could not stay away beyond the opening of the next academic year. But even if a leave of temporary absence could be secured (and the President said he would send a message to the Board of Trustees), there was, I observed, another obstacle that might prove irremovable. "To be plain, Mr. President," I continued, "I am opposed to your Philippine policy: I never wanted the Philippine Islands." "Oh," replied the President, "that need not trouble you; I didn't want the Philippine Islands, either; and in the protocol to the treaty I left myself free not to take them; but—in the end there was no alternative." My own solution of the problem had been to leave the Philippines in the hands of Spain, with the reservation of one or more naval stations at suitable points for the United States; but the President met this view with the declaration that the American people who had gone to war for the emancipation of Cuba would not, after Commodore

Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, consent to leave the oppressed Filipinos any longer under the domination of Spain. What remained? If Spain were driven out of the Philippines, and American sovereignty were not set up, the peace of the world would be endangered. This consequence the President drew, and then pointed out at some length that the Commission he proposed to send to the Philippines would have the unique opportunity and the rare duty of advising the Government and people of the United States, at a critical period in their history, in regard to the gravest problem confronting them. The Commission was to act as an advisory cabinet in the Philippines; and, besides the question of suitable local governments, the President was especially desirous of recommendations in regard to the political relations which, in view of Philippine conditions, it would be wise to establish between the United States and the 8,000,000 brown men in Asia, for whom the treaty of Paris invested us with sovereign responsibility. The treaty eliminated Spain; it was now for the United States to frame and carry into effect a policy in regard to the Philippines. To aid the Government at Washington in shaping that policy, and to co-operate with the naval and military authorities at Manila in the effective extension of American sovereignty over the archipelago, were the principal functions which the President was to assign to the Commission.

I have other than personal reasons for reciting these details. They show, in the first place, that President

McKinley's motive in compelling Spain to cede to the United States her sovereignty over the Philippine Islands was the humanitarian object of liberating the Filipinos from misgovernment and oppression; and, in the second place, that up to January, 1899, no definitive Philippine policy had been adopted or even thought out by the President, whose mind had not, indeed, travelled beyond the first step of relieving Spain of her sovereignty over the archipelago. It was still open to us, in dealing with the Filipinos, to grant them independence, to establish a protectorate over them, to confer upon them a colonial form of government, or to admit them to the dignity of a territory, or even a State, in our Union. Absolutely nothing was settled, except that Spain should cede to the United States the sovereignty which for a dozen generations she had enjoyed and exercised over the islands. And this absolute *carte blanche* which existed as to the future disposition of the Philippines, and the apparent desirability of eliminating Spain from the question, undoubtedly induced some senators of anti-expansionist sentiments to vote for the ratification of the treaty of Paris, which secured the constitutional two-thirds vote of the Senate on February 6, 1899.

## DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.

At that date, however, we were on the Pacific *en route* to the Philippines. After brief stops at Yokohama and Shanghai, we arrived at Hong Kong on February 22d. It was almost noon; and, as the hour struck, the war-ships of all nations, gay with bunting, burst into multitudinous and ear-splitting thunder which reverberated from the lofty peak of the island to the rocky shores of the Chinese mainland with all the roar and din of heaven's own artillery. Here in this British port in Asia the nations were celebrating the birthday of Washington! But I cannot describe the splendor of that scene—and still less the patriotic emotions it awakened in our hearts.

We now stood at the gateway of the Philippines. But the Philippine situation had completely changed since we left America. On February 4th, two days before the ratification of the treaty of Paris by the Senate, the Philippine army, which had hitherto been an aid or a neutral, attacked the American army in Manila. And before that, on January 21st, the insurgents had set up a Philippine Republic, based on a constitution adopted by a congress meeting at Malolos, which claimed the right to exercise sovereign jurisdiction over the archipelago. Emilio Aguinaldo, the former military dictator, the leader of the insurrection of 1896 as well as that of 1898, was President of the Philippine Republic and commander-in-chief of its military



and naval forces. Aguinaldo enjoyed the confidence of the insurgents and their sympathizers and abettors—all of whom seemed at that time to be Tagalogs—in virtue of his patriotic services, his attested honesty, and his remarkable gift of surrounding himself with able coadjutors and administrators. And so, instead of peace and a gradually extending American sovereignty, our Commission found awaiting us war and a Philippine Republic in effective control at least of the Tagalog provinces in the heart of Luzon. The authority of the United States was limited to the city of Manila, and the people of Manila—Tagalog as they are—were in sympathy with the insurgents.

The instructions of the President to our Commission being flexible, we recast our plans to meet existing circumstances. We soon discovered that the insurgents grossly misconceived the intentions of the United States in regard to the Philippines. To enlighten them and to win their confidence became, therefore, our primary aim. Happily, Manila, to which we were at first restricted, is to the Philippines what Paris is to France. Beginning, then, with Manila, we endeavored to commend to those suspicious brown men a policy of liberty and home rule under American sovereignty. We exhausted every art and method of conciliation to win them to the cause of peace. And having secured the confidence and friendship of the leading Filipinos in Manila, having convinced them of the humane and beneficent intentions of our Government, having satis-



fied them that American sovereignty was only another name for the liberty of Filipinos, we set in motion, through their agency, currents of good-will, amity, and reconciliation which overflowed the domains of the Philippine Republic, gradually spread throughout Luzon and the Visayas, and reached even to the well-guarded camps of the insurgents in arms. Though we began with Manila—and that was a matter of expediency as well as of necessity—I need scarcely say that our objective point was the Philippine Republic. To win the Philippine Republic over to the cause of peace with the recognition of American sovereignty was the supreme object of all our endeavors.

On one point, however, the Commission was inexorable. American sovereignty over the Philippines having been established by treaty was a fact which was no longer open to discussion by Filipinos in arms. And in meetings of the Commission with them I always ruled that question out of order and refused to permit any speaker to debate it. Of course there was another good ground for this attitude, namely, that the Tagalog insurgents and their Philippine Republic did not represent the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, but only a minority of them. Furthermore, it had become clear to the Commission that, from a Philippine point of view, independence, for some time at least, was an impossibility. For these reasons, and also because Aguinaldo's men were rebels in arms, we insisted that the recognition by them of American sovereignty was the first condition

of peace. On the other hand, we assured them that on their recognition of American sovereignty, we should consult them regarding the future government of the archipelago, which, we were sure, the United States would make as free, liberal, and democratic as the most intelligent Filipino desired. These efforts at conciliation culminated in the issue at an opportune time—when the American army was driving the Philippine army before it—of a proclamation by the Commission, in which the aim was to clear away misunderstandings—and you cannot even imagine how grossly the Filipinos misinterpreted American purposes—to exhibit beyond the possibility of misapprehension the liberal, friendly, and beneficent attitude of the United States to the people of the Philippine Islands.

This proclamation, which I had drafted after many conferences with Filipinos and careful study of the constitution of the Philippine Republic and other insurgent documents, produced remarkable effects. In the first place, it emboldened the Filipinos we had been winning over in Manila and made them active missionaries in the cause of peace under American sovereignty. More than that, it gave them a platform to stand on; an assurance of justice, liberty, and self-government under the American flag, which contrasted strongly with the spoliation and despotism which the insurgent government already practised. But, best of all, it enabled them to form a party in support of American sovereignty over the Philippines. They afterward called

themselves the Federal Party; but they were then known as Autonomists. One of the ablest and most helpful of them all, Mr. Florentino Torres, now a judge of the Supreme Court, in making last spring a report to General McArthur on the origin and formation of the Federal Party, wrote as follows:

“They called themselves ‘Autonomists,’ for they presented themselves to the Commission, of which Mr. Schurman was president, in 1899, laid their ideas and aspirations before it, and accepted the basis for a government announced in the proclamation of said Commission, and the principles upon which an autonomic administration is founded.”\*

As Judge Torres goes on to explain, the Autonomists were afterward joined by disillusionized insurgents:

“The idea of independence having been laid aside, and American sovereignty having been unconditionally accepted, there was no essential disagreement between those who had come over from the revolutionists and the so-called Autonomists, whom time and circumstances have proved to have been right, and from the very beginning there has been no difficulty in coming to an agreement among themselves for the purpose of founding and organizing the political party which was planned and which, by common consent, they called the Federal Party. This party is based upon the principles of self-government, essentially and substantially the same as the principles which were laid down in a pro-

\* Annual Reports of the War Department for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1901. Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army. In four parts. Part II., p. 120.

posed federal constitution for the future government of this archipelago, which was drawn up and submitted to the former Schurman Commission by the Autonomists." \*

But among the insurgents themselves the efforts of our Commission to bring about peace and reconciliation produced results not less favorable and far more dramatic than those achieved in the formation of a pro-American party in Manila. Let me remind you that the time was April and May, 1899. Malolos had been taken by our troops and the insurgents had fled to the province of Neuva Ecija, where their government was established at San Isidro. The head of Aguinaldo's cabinet was Apolinario Mabini, a young man of fragile and paralytic frame, but of a keen, subtile, and logical intellect, imaginative too, more speculative, perhaps, than practical, a shaper of policies rather than a leader of men, except in so far as he exhibited inflexible constancy to the cause of Philippine independence and a fierce, irreconcilable, and inextinguishable hatred of the Government of the United States. As long as Mabini remained at the head of Aguinaldo's cabinet there was no possibility of inducing the insurgent Filipinos to accept American sovereignty. But when the proclamation of our Commission reached the insurgent ranks—and a large number of copies circulated among them—the leaders perceived that under American sovereignty they would enjoy greater liberties than they had ever dreamt of

\* Annual Reports of the War Department. Part II., p. 121.



under Spanish rule, and, if not a nominal independence, at least a firmer and surer self-government than their own Philippine Republic could ever guarantee. The demoralization of the Philippine army was meanwhile going on apace, thanks to the continuous victories of General Lawton and General MacArthur. And the Commission, who had timed the issue of the proclamation, after conference with General Otis, so that the hand of conciliation might be felt at the same time as the hand of force, watched anxiously for the result on the insurgent authorities. Nor had we long to wait for the realization of our most sanguine expectations. On May 1st the Congress of the Philippine Republic voted for the cessation of war and the adoption of peace on the basis of our proclamation. Mabini's cabinet was overturned, and a new cabinet was formed, pledged to peace and reconciliation, with Paterno at its head and Buencamino as his most important colleague. The story is told by Buencamino himself in the following words:

“About that time, in the month of April, a vast number of copies of the proclamation of the first Commission, presided over by Mr. Schurman, reached the insurgent field; this document, although vague in its details, was perfectly clear in its liberal and democratic principles.

“Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Pedro Paterno, without any previous agreement, saw in this proclamation a door through which they could enter into friendly and harmonious relations with the Americans. All the



members of Congress adopted this policy, with the exception of a few partisans of Mabini, who was at that time president of the cabinet.

"Hence it is that at the first meeting of Congress in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, the first day of May, 1899, it was resolved to change the war policy for one of peace with the United States; and this change having been accepted by Don Emilio Aguinaldo, it resulted, as was natural, in a change in the cabinet, Señor Mabini being substituted by Don Pedro Paterno, who, with Don Felipe Buencamino, proclaimed the new policy of conciliation.

"The first political act of the new cabinet was the appointment of the Commission to come to this city to confer with the American authorities to agree upon terms of honorable surrender, this noble mission having been confided to Señor Buencamino and others of his colleagues in the cabinet."\*

Nothing seemed needed to complete the success of our Commission. We had won over the Philippine Republic to the policy of peace and recognition of American sovereignty over the Philippine Islands. This policy had been adopted by the Congress of the Philippine Republic by a vote almost unanimous. President Aguinaldo had concurred. A cabinet in sympathy with the new policy, and pledged to carry it out, had taken the place of Mabini and his colleagues. And a commission of cabinet members had been appointed, and were now ready to set out, to carry the tidings to us in Manila.

\* Annual Reports of the War Department for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1901. Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army. In four parts. Part II., p. 118.

But the kaleidoscope shifts, and behold a tragedy! In its patriotic effort to bring about peace, the Philippine Republic itself suffers collapse. Done to death by its own false friends, I shall never forget that its last expiring voice was for peace and reconciliation on the basis of the proclamation issued by our Commission. But what the congress, cabinet, and president of the Philippine Republic so unanimously resolved, Luna, the general commanding their army, as completely frustrated. He arrested the delegates who had been so solemnly authorized by congress, cabinet, and president to proceed to Manila, accused them of treason, and sentenced some to imprisonment and others to death.

The friends of peace and reconciliation were, indeed, avenged. Luna himself was assassinated in the following month by adherents of Aguinaldo. Following the law of self-preservation Aguinaldo immediately took Luna's place as general in active command of the forces. Republic or no republic, liberty or despotism, national prosperity or national misery, the insurgents, still in arms, were ready to sacrifice everything to their own selfish ambition, ignorance, and insane folly. The officers would not abandon their high positions to sink into their former insignificance in the civil community; and the soldiers preferred living on others to working for themselves. Military power released from civil authority always lapses into a selfish and remorseless tyranny. And nowhere is this law more tragically illustrated than in the Philippines. Such an unholy

carnival of militarism, despotism, brigandage, cruelty, and wholesale intimidation of peaceful and unoffending inhabitants as the disorganized insurgent bands have since enacted in different parts of the Philippine Islands is without parallel in Occidental history—and finds a parallel in Asia alone.

The poor Philippine Republic was not only dead, but —what is equally important in oriental politics—it never again pretended to be alive. In America, indeed, honest and patriotic, but sadly misinformed, citizens still talked of the new republic of the Orient and that youthful father of his country, Emilio Aguinaldo. But the cold fact is, that since those tragic happenings in the province of Nueva Ecija, in the month of May, 1899, there has not been even the semblance of a Philippine Republic; all clean gone are its congress, cabinet, president, and other civil officers; while the opposition to the establishment of American sovereignty has proceeded, not so much from the patriotism of the people as from the selfishness of individuals, from the lust of military power and oppression, and from the spirit of robbery and brigandage.

Nothing remained throughout the area occupied by the insurgents but to meet force with force; and this was done first by General Otis, and later, with brilliant results, by General MacArthur, who had the rare good-fortune, through General Funston, of capturing Aguinaldo. But the Philippine Islands are a vast archipelago; and the insurgent operations never embraced the

whole of it. The insurgents were indeed active in many provinces of Luzon; and, of the Visayan Islands, Panay, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, and Leyte, were partly under their influence or control. But even in 1899, when their power was at its height, they were not admitted to Negros, which declared for American sovereignty, and voluntarily raised the American flag; and, with insignificant exceptions, they got no hold of the great island of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, or the remote island of Palawan. These southern islands are occupied by Mohammedan and heathen tribes. Mindanao has a sprinkling of Christian Filipinos on the coasts, but no more; Balabac and the Sulu Archipelago are Mohammedan, and Palawan is settled on the sea-coast by Mohammedans, and in the interior by heathen.

The insurgents, however, were making efforts to win over the Christian Island of Negros and to enlist the support of the southern islands. Already they held Zamboanga, on the western tip of Mindanao, and some other points. The Commission thought it desirable to send encouragement to Negros, and to quicken and strengthen the loyalty it had so early manifested. And it seemed especially desirable to secure the Mohammedan chieftains of the southern islands, more particularly the Sultan of Sulu, who claimed a kind of suzerainty over them all. On this business I set out early in June, my colleagues remaining in Manila to attend to other matters. I met with enthusiastic receptions in Bacolod, the capital of Negros, at Silay on the north and Dumaguete on



the south of the island, as well as at other points; and at all these towns I had good opportunities of proclaiming to the people the beneficent intentions of our Government and assuring them of the liberty and prosperity which would follow peace under American rule. I visited the towns of Ilo-Ilo and Cebu, which were the only other points we at that time held in the Visayas, and then proceeded to Mindanao, Sulu, Palawan, and the Calamianes. My especial object was to induce the Sultan of Sulu to enter into an agreement accepting American sovereignty. I knew the terms of the agreement which he had made with Spain some years before. Under these circumstances I told the Sultan of the war between the United States and Spain, and of the change of sovereignty in the Philippine Islands consequent upon that war. He said that Spain had been an old and inveterate enemy of the Sulus, and he spoke boastfully of the issues of their contests with her. I pointed out that, as the United States desired only its own rights, on which, however, it would insist, there was no reason why the Sultan should not be our friend, for the United States would hold inviolable his rights, and scrupulously respect the religion, the customs, and the sentiments of his people. I suggested a renewal of the agreement he had made with Spain. To this he at first demurred; he wanted better terms; more particularly he desired to make Maibun (his capital), or Siassi, a free port of his own. I replied that it would be out of the question for the sover-



eign power to abdicate or part with its jurisdiction over any of the harbors or territorial waters of the archipelago. He then suggested other modifications in his own interest. But, when all were politely but firmly rejected, the Sultan finally said that if he could not secure any better terms, he would be willing to acknowledge American sovereignty in the terms of the agreement he had made with Spain.

I congratulated him on his wise decision, expressed my admiration of the beauty of his charming island, and suggested that its resources were capable of indefinite development, if capital and proper skill were only applied. He spoke of the havoc wrought by pestilence among his people, and added, with a mingled air of pathos and helplessness, that he did not even know their numbers, for, unlike more advanced peoples, they had never had a census.

I cabled the result of my interview to Washington, and recommended that this plan of making agreements be followed with the other chieftains in the southern islands. In a short time the military authorities began to carry out this policy; and as a result, the fierce and implacable Moros of Sulu, Palawan, and Mindanao never became enemies of the United States. Thus the great southern islands of the archipelago were saved to us. Censorious critics blamed us for making a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu and not emancipating his slaves! The so-called "treaty" was simply an amicable acceptance by the Sultan of American sovereignty

over his islands in the same terms in which, after many bloody contests, he had been forced to recognize the sovereignty of Spain. As to the abolition of slavery—and I rode through plantations worked by slaves—had I mooted such a policy at that meeting in June, 1899, I might have kindled a terrible Mohammedan war. Contact with Christian civilization will undoubtedly lead to emancipation—which some of the datos have since proclaimed—and I thought the gradual abolition of slavery by peaceful methods better than the provocation of a war of Mohammedans against Christians, which an insistence on immediate emancipation would in all probability have produced.

#### THE QUESTIONS OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE AND AN AMERICAN PROTECTORATE.

I have no intention of describing the work done by the first Philippine Commission. In accepting its final report early in 1900 and discharging it, President McKinley, with the generous appreciation that characterized the man, spoke in highly laudatory terms of the service the Commission had rendered to the Government and to the country, and invited us to retain our places in a second Commission which, however, nearly all of us were obliged to decline. Apart from the diplomatic and executive functions of the first Commission, and its confidential advices to Washington, the final report of

four printed volumes may be cited as evidence of the industry and fidelity with which we studied the Philippine question in its many-sided complexity and its inexhaustible difficulty.

It fell to me to investigate, and report upon, two questions of intense interest and of transcendent importance. One was the form of government—municipal, provincial, and general—which should be established in the Philippine Islands. The other, and more fundamental, question concerned the political relations which ought to obtain between the Philippine Islands and the United States. The results of my inquiries were, after adoption, embodied in the report of the Commission, and published first in the preliminary report,\* and afterward in the final report, where, under the heading of “The Government of the Philippine Islands,” they occupy nearly half of the first volume. The two questions were studied together, and in each case the determining factors were the actual circumstances and conditions of the inhabitants of the archipelago and the sentiments and ideals of their most intelligent spokesmen.

The question of the political relations of the United States to the Philippine Islands, to which I had necessarily given much thought and study, became the dominant issue in the presidential campaign, which began soon after the presentation of the report of our Commission. On that question I had gone to the Philippines with decided preferences. As I had been averse to ac-

\* See the section on “Capacity for Self-government,” pp. 181–183.

cepting from Spain sovereignty over the archipelago, so I was desirous of finding a way to escape the burdensome responsibility which I believed we had assumed. Two questions were constantly recurring to my mind: Might not the United States grant independence to the Filipinos? Or, if that were impracticable, might we not surrender our sovereignty and establish a protectorate?

What I have already said of the collapse of the Philippine Republic, in May, 1899, throws some light on these questions. That unhappy organization never had extensive jurisdiction, except in ink and paper. But after the spring of 1899, it abdicated even its literary existence. On whom, then, could the United States have conferred independence, had it so desired? The Mohammedan and heathen tribes in the southern islands—more than a third of the area of the entire archipelago—were not hostile, and their datus and chieftains were being secured by agreements, after the model of our first agreement with the Sultan of Sulu. Or, if we confine attention to the Christianized Philippines, namely, Luzon and the Visayas and the smaller adjacent islands, there was no political organization representing their inhabitants—the defunct Philippine Republic was almost altogether a Tagalog organization—on whom the trust of sovereignty might have been devolved. There was not even a single military leader whom all accepted. Thus at the present time General Lukban, who is fighting us in Samar, and General Malvar, in southern Luzon,



are playing independently their own hands. What reasonable man, indeed, could have expected harmonious co-operation from Visayans, Tagalogs, Vicolos, Ilocanos, and the other peoples of Luzon and the Visayas, who was aware of their ancient rivalries and jealousies, their mutually unintelligible languages, and the isolation in which they lived in consequence of the lack of decent means of communication?

There was really no political organization to endow with the function of sovereignty, had the United States desired to confer sovereignty upon the Filipinos. And men of education and men of property were very emphatic in their rejection of such a gift, whenever the hypothesis was presented to them. Let me repeat what I said in the report of the Commission:\*

“ While the peoples of the Philippine Islands ardently desire a full measure of rights and liberties, they do not, in the opinion of the Commission, generally desire independence. Hundreds of witnesses testified on this subject to the Commission and its individual members, and, though they represented all possible varieties of opinion—many of them being in sympathy with the insurgents—they were uniform in their testimony, that in view of the ignorance and political inexperience of the masses of the people, the multiplicity of languages, the divergencies of culture and mode of life, and the obstacles to intercommunication, an independent sovereign Philippine State was at the present time neither possible nor desirable, even if its poverty and internal weakness and lack of coherence would not invite, and the dissatis-

\* Vol. I., pp. 82-83 ( “The Government of the Philippine Islands ”).



faction of aliens entail, the intervention of foreign powers, with the inevitable result of the division of the archipelago among them and the disappearance forever of the dream and hope of a united and self-governing Philippine commonwealth. The Philippine Islands, even the most patriotic declare, cannot, at the present time, stand alone. They need the tutelage and protection of the United States. But they need it in order that, in due time, they may, in their opinion, become self-governing and independent. For it would be a misrepresentation of facts not to report that ultimate independence—independence after an undefined period of American training—is the aspiration and goal of the intelligent Filipinos who to-day so strenuously oppose the suggestion of independence at the present time.”

But if immediate independence for the Filipinos were an absolute impossibility (unless the aim were to invite anarchy and chaos, to be followed by the absorption of the archipelago at the hands of the great powers of Europe), might not an American protectorate over the archipelago be a better solution of the problem than the retention of that sovereignty which Spain had transferred to us by the terms of the treaty of Paris? This solution, which was subsequently embodied as a plank in the democratic national platform, engaged much of my attention in the year 1899. It had the apparent merit of relieving us of the onerous and thankless undertaking of governing the Filipinos. For that reason it appealed strongly to my own sympathies; and my judgment was greatly impressed by the success of the British

protectorate which Sir Andrew Clarke had established over races kindred to the Filipinos in the Federated Malay States. And Englishmen, whom one meets everywhere in the Orient, were confident that what they had done in Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan, we ought to do in Luzon, the Visayas, and the rest of the Philippine Islands. With my own predilections, and under arguments so cogent, I was quite open to persuasion that an exchange of our sovereignty for a protectorate over the Philippine Islands might be our wisest policy, and that, both from its inherent desirability and the probability, as demonstrated by experience among other Malaysians, of its producing the best results. But the more I tested this policy in the light of actual Philippine conditions, the less ground I perceived for the hopes its first formulation had awakened.

In a measure, however, this policy, in spirit, if not in the letter, had been adopted, as I have already explained, in dealing with the inhabitants of the Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and Palawan. To take the first and typical case, we recognized the Sultan of Sulu as the "king and shepherd of his people" (if I may use an Homeric phrase of so unclassical a community); and so far as we govern the tribes within his jurisdiction, we govern them through the Sultan. We have made similar agreements with Dato Mandi and other chieftains in Mindanao and perhaps Palawan. And this policy is susceptible of extension to all the tribes, heathen as well as Mohammedan, which inhabit those southern islands.

But, as will be recognized when once pointed out, this is a policy which presupposes monarchs or chieftains. It can be applied only to peoples who render obedience to monarch-like rulers, whether they be called princes, khedives, sultans, datos, or rajahs. The position is generally hereditary, and this is the case with the sultanate of Sulu, as it is with the corresponding position of rajah in the Federated Malay States. Through such a single and permanent executive or hereditary ruler it becomes possible for the protecting power to have fixed relations with the protected community. A State whose supreme power is divided among executives and fluctuates from time to time, would wait long in the market before finding a protector. A protectorate presupposes a definite and permanent ruler to protect; and, if we may judge from the examples of India, the Malay Peninsula, Egypt, and other parts of Africa, it is especially congenial to hereditary rule.

The chieftaincies and sultanates, which still survive in Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu group (where Spanish sovereignty scarcely extended into the interior, and was effective only on the coast), existed throughout the entire archipelago at the time of the Spanish conquest. But the Spanish system of government was uncongenial to the system of native rulership, and by degrees the native potentates disappeared throughout Luzon and the Visayan Islands, and all the region in which Spanish dominion was effective. Thus the Christianized Filipinos, who number over 6,000,000 souls,

are to-day, as I wrote in the report of the Commission,\* "a pure democracy, without distinctions of birth or rank—a mass of people without hereditary chieftains or rulers. The Spanish governor-general once ruled them with the aid of soldiers, civilians, and ecclesiastics from Spain, and now that Spanish sovereignty is gone, there are no constituted authorities, no natural leaders, who can speak for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Aguinaldo's influence over the Tagalogs might, indeed, have been utilized, had he not made war upon their liberators; and there are other natives who enjoy much prestige among the Visayans, Vicolos, Pampangos, Pangasinanes, Ilocanos, and Cagayanes. But so long as obedience remains the essence of government, the fact is indisputable, that while the sultans of the Malay Peninsula ruled their own States, there was nothing corresponding to them in Luzon and the Visayan Islands, in which, therefore, the Americans were stopped from instituting a protectorate, even had they desired to copy in a territory over which they possessed sovereignty the practice of the British in dealing with a territory over which they neither had nor pretended to have a shadow of sovereignty."

For it must not be forgotten in this connection that while we went into the Philippine Islands with all the rights of sovereignty, Great Britain intervened in the affairs of the Malay States solely on the invitation of their chieftains. She instituted a protectorate over the Malay Peninsula because she had no sovereignty there, and because there existed in the sultans established

\* Vol. I., p. 101.



monarchs who desired, or were induced to ask for, her protection. And the problem of gaining the country and governing the people resolved itself simply into the problem of winning and then controlling the sultans.

In the Malay States, Great Britain set up a protectorate because they had sultans and she had no sovereignty. In Luzon and the Visayas there are no sultans, and the United States has sovereignty. The conclusion in favor of an American protectorate over the Christianized Philippines is certainly not derived by parity of reasoning.

I must, however, acknowledge that the policy of an American protectorate was very dear to the heart of the insurgents. But in citing the example of the Federated Malay States, they were playing with a two-edged weapon. For each of the Malayan States has become a veiled crowned colony, in which, though everything is done in the name of the Sultan (who flies his own flag and enjoys increased income), the British authorities have exclusive control of taxation and expenditures, give "advice" which the Sultan must adopt, and even push their dominion to the extent of deposing the Sultan and settling the succession, or ordaining a general manumission of slaves. These essential features of the British protectorate over the Federated Malay States were the last thing the insurgents desired to see incorporated in the scheme of an American protectorate over the Philippine Islands. The only kind of protectorate they ever attempted to formulate was one under which the



United States, like a good angel, should incur all the responsibility of protecting a Philippine government (when one was created) against foreign nations, while the Philippine officials themselves collected all the revenues and exercised all the power. But, as I showed in the report of the Commission:

“The idea of a protectorate entertained by the insurgent leaders, under which they should enjoy all the powers of an independent sovereign government, and the Americans should assume all obligations to foreign nations for their good use of those powers, would create an impossible situation for the United States. Internal dominion and external responsibility must go hand in hand. Under the chimerical scheme of protection cherished by Aguinaldo, if a foreigner lost his life or property through a miscarriage of justice in a Philippine court, or in consequence of a governor’s failure to suppress a riot, then the United States would be responsible for indemnity to the foreigner’s government, though without possessing the power of punishing the offenders, of preventing such maladministration, or of protecting itself against similar occurrences in the future. Nor could the liability to foreign nations be reduced without permitting them directly to seek redress; and such a course would, it is to be feared, speedily lead to the appropriation of the Philippine Islands by the great powers who would not need to seek far for pretences for intervention.

“Undoubtedly the raising of the American flag in the Philippine Islands has entailed great responsibilities upon us; but to guarantee external protection while renouncing internal dominion is no way of escaping from

them; on the contrary, while you pull down the flag, you only pile up difficulties.”\*

### PLAN OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES.

This conclusion made the question of government a very important one. As I have already stated, it was my duty to write that portion of our report. The Commission felt strongly that civil government should be established at the earliest possible date. Military rule is always unsatisfactory, and the Philippine reformers had, in the days of Spanish dominion, always denounced it, and insisted on civil government as the indispensable guarantee of their rights and liberties. Of course they were no more tolerant of the American government of military occupation. And the Commission fully sympathized with their aspirations for a government regulated by formal and public law, to take the place of the arbitrary orders of the military commander. After working out a scheme of civil government, which the Commission adopted, I wrote as follows in regard to the time and place of putting it into operation:

“The Commission recommend that in all parts of Luzon and the Visayan Islands where American occupation is effective, this scheme of civil government be put in operation where practicable, as soon as possible, though with the retention in every case of such military forces as may be deemed necessary for the protection of the civil communities thus organized. And as

\* Vol. I., p. 103.

American authority is extended over the remaining districts, islands, and peoples of the archipelago, there should be a corresponding extension of civil government until all the civilized peoples of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and the coast of Mindanao enjoy the benefits of the territorial administration. There is no need to wait for the suppression of the insurrection in all the islands before giving civil government and local home rule to such as are at peace and are fit for it. Considering the varieties of the peoples and the friendliness of most of them to the United States, it would be both unjust and impolitic to treat them all alike as unworthy of civil government; and looking to the pacification of those still hostile, the Commission believes that no instrumentality would be so effective to that end as the establishment of civil government in the communities which are already friendly.”\*

In outlining a scheme of civil government for the Philippine Islands, I first studied the system which Spain had established, and then noted and discussed the objections which Philippine reformers (especially the radicals and insurgents) made to that system and the modifications which they proposed for its improvement. I must refer to the report † for the details of the investigation, but the following summary of the Spanish system of government for the Philippines—municipal, provincial, and general—is so brief that it may be cited here:

“It goes without saying that the governor-general was appointed by the Spanish Government. He was

\* Report, pp. 118–119.

† See Vol. I., pp. 43–97.

assisted by a council of administration, whose members were, in part, appointed by the Spanish Government, and in part elected by the provincial juntas, which the Spanish Government controlled. Spain also appointed the governor of every province; and of the council or junta which assisted the governor, only the minority of the members were elected—and these not by the people at large, but by the heads or mayors ('municipal captains') of the towns of the province. Thus it was that neither in the government of the province nor in the general government of the archipelago had the inhabitants of the Philippines any control, and scarcely even a voice. Indeed, those provincial councils, for which the heads of the municipalities were permitted to elect a minority of the members, had only advisory powers in relation to the governor, whose decision in all matters was supreme; and, besides advising the governor, the councils had no other function but to inspect the administration of the affairs of the municipalities.

"Even the municipal councils were, therefore, not bodies controlled by the people. In addition to constant inspection and direction from the provincial junta, every municipal council was liable to warning, admonition, fines, and suspension, at the hands of the governor of the province. And to make the control from above still more effective, the governor-general exercised jurisdiction over all the municipal councils, and was vested with power to discharge members, or even the entire council itself.

"Even when municipal government had been thus circumscribed, the masses of the people had no share in it. Suffrage was limited to the 'principal people' of



the town, and elections were indirect. The 'principal people' were present and past office-holders and persons paying fifty dollars land tax. The 'principal people,' as thus constituted, elected by ballot twelve delegates, and these elected the municipal tribunal, which actually governed the town." \*

In this system of government the Philippine reformers demanded a number of changes. Some of the features of the system which contented them are more surprising than the features they objected to. They naturally demanded a large measure of decentralization with increased autonomy and independence for the provincial and the municipal governments. They demanded direct elections by properly qualified voters. But, though they favored an extension of the franchise, it was only to recognize other tax-payers than the land-owners (to whom the Spanish law restricted the franchise, along with former office-holders), and to admit as voters persons holding academic degrees, or perhaps even possessing an elementary education.

But still more surprising than the reformers' aversion to universal suffrage is their rejection of absolute home rule for their towns and provinces. The constitution of the Philippine Republic expressly provides for "intervention" of the central government in the affairs of the provincial and municipal government. This idea of "intervention," which is foreign to us, is fundamental to the whole political life and thought of the

\* *Idem*, pp. 182-183 (Preliminary Report).



Filipinos. Acquired from long experience with Spanish methods of government, the idea has taken such a firm hold of the mind of the Filipinos that they find government of any kind inconceivable without it.

Now if the general government which the United States sets up for the archipelago is to exercise inspection, regulation, and control over the functions of the provincial and municipal governments—and all that is implied in the notion of “intervention”—surely these latter may be intrusted with a large measure of autonomy without any danger to the public interests. And so we recommended that Philippine towns and provinces should be vested with substantially the same powers as are enjoyed by towns and counties in the United States. As to suffrage, while favoring its extension, we recommended its limitation by a property or educational qualification. I endeavored to sum up the treatment of provincial and municipal government as follows:

“It is necessary, in dealing with this subject, to recall what has already been said of the idea entertained by the Filipinos of the necessity of intervention and control on the part of the Manila government over the doings of the provincial and municipal authorities. Even in local affairs, it is not an absolute but a qualified home rule they desire; they look for supervision and regulation from the central government at Manila. If this expectation is satisfied by the continuance of the custom of inspection and ultimate control from Manila, and this the Commission deem absolutely essential, it will be safe, and, in the opinion of the Commission, expedi-

ent and desirable to grant to the inhabitants of the archipelago a large measure of home rule in local affairs. Their towns should enjoy substantially the rights, privileges, and immunities of towns in one of the Territories of the United States.

“As to the provinces, the Commission is of the opinion, in view of the facts submitted in the preceding sections, that they should be turned into counties (with or without consolidation or division, as circumstances of size, population, race, physical features, etc., may determine) and vested with substantially the same functions as those enjoyed by a county in one of the Territories of the United States. This system might be applied to Luzon and the Visayan Islands at once, with some exceptions, though inconsiderable, in the mountain regions, and a beginning might also be made on the coasts of Mindanao, while the Sulu Archipelago, calling for special arrangements with the Sultan, need not be considered in this connection. It is, of course, intended that the Filipinos themselves shall, subject to the general laws which may be enacted in this regard, manage their own town and county affairs by the agency of their own officers whom they themselves elect, with no contribution to this work from American officials except what is implied in the Philippine conception of intervention and control on the part of the central government at Manila. The suffrage should be restricted by educational or property qualifications.”\*

As to the central or general government for the archipelago, I early became convinced of the necessity of a radical change in the Spanish system. After an ex-

\* Report. Vol. I., pp. 97-98.

tended examination of that system, I summarized its defects in the following terms:

“The scheme of government instituted by Spain for the Philippines was, in itself, far from perfect, and in its practical operations it was open to the gravest objections. It failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good government—the maintenance of peace and order and the even administration of justice; nor can there be any doubt that it proved an engine of oppression and exploitation of the Filipinos. It took their substance in the form of taxes and contributions, and gave no equivalent in return. The preceding sections have shown the use made of the public moneys, which was in general an unproductive one. The people paid heavy taxes and were subject to annoying and vexatious restrictions on their rights; yet the country was not developed, roads were not made, popular education was not established. It almost seemed as though the great trust of government had been perverted into a mere instrument for the benefit of the governing class at the expense of their subjects. The revenues were swallowed up by salaries, most of which seemed unnecessary. The very category of public works is only another designation for salaries. There were in reality no public works. The revenues of the archipelago were exhausted by unproductive expenditures on naval and military establishments, on salaries and pensions, on the church, and on the colonial office in Madrid. And the people governed had no redress, as they had no control or voice in the matter.

“The most prominent defects in this scheme of government were: (1) The boundless and autocratic powers of the governor-general; (2) the centralization of all

governmental functions in Manila; (3) the absence of representative institutions in which the Filipinos might make their needs and desires known; (4) a pernicious system of taxation; (5) a plethora of officials who lived on the country, and by their very numbers obstructed, like a circumlocution office, the public business they professed to transact; (6) division of minor responsibilities through the establishment of rival boards and offices; (7) the costliness of the system and the corruption it bred; and (8) confusion between the functions of the State and the functions of the church and of the religious orders.”\*

The first reform, that on which all others depend, is the admission of the Filipinos themselves to a participation in the functions and control of government. They have reached a stage of progress and civilization, at least in Luzon and the Visayas, which entitles them to representative institutions. And the constitution of the Philippine Republic was responsive to popular demand in providing for a representative legislature, which was designated an assembly. Had Spain granted the reiterated demand of Philippine reformers for representative institutions, it is highly probable that her flag would to-day be waving over the archipelago. And in this connection I must reiterate what I have elsewhere said of our own obligation to understand, appreciate, and sympathize with the ideas and sentiments of the Filipinos:

“The United States can succeed in governing the Philippines only by understanding the character and

\* Report. Vol. I., pp. 81-82.



circumstances of the people and realizing sympathetically their aspirations and ideals. A government, to stand, must be firmly rooted in the needs, interests, judgment, and devotion of the people; and this support is secured by the adaptation of government to the character and possibilities of the governed—what they are, what they have it in them to become, what they want, and, not least, what they think they are entitled to have and enjoy.”\*

Of course, so long as the United States retains sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, so long must its control of the central or general government be absolute and indisputable. The responsibilities of sovereignty cannot be discharged without corresponding powers. And in any delegation of political privileges to the people of the dependency, the rights reserved to the sovereign power must be plenipotent and unquestionable. We invite the Filipinos to co-operate with Americans in the administration of general affairs, from Manila as a centre, and to undertake, subject to American control, the administration of the local affairs of the towns and provinces. But the United States is, and, so long as it retains sovereignty over the archipelago, it must remain, the predominant partner.

The problem, then, is to reconcile American sovereignty with Philippine autonomy. If we look to the British Empire for a model, we find the self-governing colony, like Canada, which is so independent that Great Britain exercises only a nominal sovereignty over it; or

\* Report. Vol. I., p. 82.



we find the crown colony, like Hong Kong, or the dependency, like India, in which the natives are without representative institutions and are ruled by the arbitrary will of the sovereign or his representatives. The Government of Canada or Australia is really independent or sovereign, but filial piety and community of race, interest, and sentiment serve to maintain the nominal connection with the mother country. Were the inhabitants of these colonies of a different race and color from the British, they would long ago formally have set up as independent and sovereign communities, as, indeed, the Boers, European though they are, have during the last two or three years made incredible exertions to do in South Africa. The United States, therefore, could not, without imperilling, or even abdicating, its sovereignty, confer upon the Filipinos representative institutions and responsible government like that of Canada or Australia. On the other hand, to govern them as the people of India are governed by Great Britain would be to defeat their aspirations, to belittle their capabilities, and to frustrate a principal object of their revolt against Spanish authority, which was the occasion of their falling under the sovereignty of the United States.

To reconcile the political rights and privileges of the Filipinos with the inviolable sovereignty of the United States, I turned to the congressional acts organizing the successive territories of the Union, beginning with the classic Jeffersonian measure of 1804 for the organization of the territory of Louisiana. For every necessary

and desirable feature to be incorporated in a bill organizing the government of the Philippine Islands I found a precedent in the several acts under which Congress had organized the territories. Thus I recommended that Congress should retain the right to veto all Philippine legislation; that the Filipinos should be represented by a delegate in Congress; that the governor of the Philippine Islands should be appointed by the President of the United States, and should have at least a restrictive veto on the acts of the Philippine legislature; that this legislature should consist of a lower house, or assembly, elected by the people, under suitable educational and property qualifications, and of an upper house—a legislative council or senate—in part elected by the people and in part nominated by the President of the United States; and that members of the governor's cabinet or the heads of departments, who were to be partly Americans and partly Filipinos, should also be members of the upper branch of the legislature.

These several features were discussed with prominent and progressive Filipinos, some of whom were good enough to embody their views in a model constitution or law for the organization of the Government of the archipelago. This bill of theirs is printed as an appendix\* to the report of the Commission, and I have discussed it at some length in the chapters on the plan of government for the Philippines. My own views, which the Commission adopted, were outlined as follows:

\* See Exhibit VI. (Vol. I., pp. 216-228).

“ From the very outset, however, it will be safe and desirable, in the opinion of the Commission, to extend to the Filipinos larger liberties of self-government than Jefferson approved of for the inhabitants of Louisiana. Assuming that in the Sulu Archipelago, and in such portions of Mindanao and Palawan as are still occupied by tribal Indians, the Government will be conducted through the agency of their sultans, datos, or chiefs, it is to the remainder of the Philippine Islands, more particularly to Luzon and the Visayas and the coasts of Mindanao, that the territorial form of government is to be adapted. Now, the Commission believes that the people of these regions, under suitable property and educational qualifications, should be permitted to elect at least the members of the lower branch of the territorial legislature. Paterno’s scheme of government, as has been already explained, demanded a legislature elected by the people for the making of laws on local subjects. He seems to have had in mind a legislature with a single chamber, which is also the organization of the legislature in the constitution of the so-called Philippine Republic. But the model constitution (Exhibit VI.) prepared for the Commission by those Filipinos who sought to adjust the claims of the insurgent leaders to the rights of American sovereignty provides for a bicameral legislature, whose branches are designated, respectively, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The latter is to be composed of one hundred and ten members, elected by the people, who are apportioned among the eleven regions into which this constitution redistricts the archipelago as fairly as may be in proportion to their population, the distribution, however, being subject to modification hereafter when a correct census shall have been taken.

“But this constitution, which provides for popular representation in the lower chamber, does not make the Senate or upper house wholly elective. Of its twenty-two members, the eleven regions or electoral districts are to elect one each, and the other eleven are to be appointed by the American governor-general, and, when appointed, to enjoy a life term. It would harmonize better with American practice to have these appointments made by the President; and there seems no good reason why the term of office should not be the same as that of elective senators, which the constitution fixes at four years. But here the important thing to emphasize is the proposal in a constitution, which comes from radical Filipinos, that the proper United States authority should appoint half the members of the Senate.

“This constitution also provides that the secretaries or members of the cabinet of the governor-general may be members of either chamber; and if not members, shall have the right to sit and speak in either chamber. With such safeguards in American hands, the qualified veto power which this constitution gives the governor-general (which includes the right to suspend the law for a year, even after its passage by a two-thirds vote of the legislature over his veto) would probably be adequate for the purposes of good government, especially since, under the territorial plan of government, Congress may (and should) retain the right to veto all territorial legislation. But for that very reason, in addition to other good grounds, the Filipinos should be represented by a delegate in Congress.

“It is important to add, as a further illustration of the aversion (which amounts almost to abhorrence) of the Filipinos to military government, that this constitution provides that the American governor-general shall



be 'a civilian,' just as the Negros constitution also declared, in its bill of rights, that 'The military power is subordinate to the civil, and cannot use its military functions to deprive the citizen of his civil and political rights.'

"The changes suggested in the Jeffersonian scheme of government for Louisiana, in the light of the ideals formulated by prominent and progressive Filipinos—that is, an elected lower house with an upper house half elected and half nominated—would practically convert the scheme into a territorial government of the first class. And this, after due consideration of circumstances and conditions in the Philippines, is what the Commission earnestly recommends."\*

But while our territorial form of government furnished the type of organization the Commission recommended for the Philippines, we insisted that the Philippine government should be held completely aloof from the American system. In so far as the United States governed the islands, we were strongly of the opinion that it should govern them at arm's length. Anything like the mingling of Philippine affairs with American affairs would, in the judgment of the Commission, prove a serious mistake. The archipelago, we thought, should remain, politically, as separate from the United States as India is from the United Kingdom. As it is the policy of our republic to maintain a national development unmixed with Asiatic immigrants, so it is to the interest of the Filipinos to have opportunity for a full and independent development of their own individual

\* Vol. I., pp. 109-111.

capacities, their own racial characteristics, and their own civilization. Their own organic life being thus recognized as self-contained and inviolable, when it reaches a degree of maturity qualifying them for independence, a new republic may arise in Asia without any shock to the United States of America. For if, under American training, the Filipinos come to fit themselves for sovereign independence, I have no doubt Americans will grant it if the Filipinos then desire it.

The Commission recommended that the finances of the Philippine Islands should be kept entirely separate from those of the United States. In that connection I wrote as follows:

“There are two fundamental principles on which a successful administration of the finances of dependent territories must rest. First, their finances must be managed, not for the advantage of the sovereign power, but for the benefit of the people and the development of the country whose destinies have been committed to its supreme control. Up to the eighteenth century all the great colonizing powers thought of their colonies as estates to be farmed for the benefit of their European proprietors. This theory cost England her first colonial empire in America, and then she abandoned it. Spain retained it, and her colonial empire has dropped from her grasp. There is no instance in history of the successful government of a colony where profit to the parent State or its citizens has been a leading consideration.

“The second vital principle of the financial administration of dependent territories is that they should be

made self-supporting; and to accomplish that object should be the principal aim of the United States in the financial administration of the Philippines—and to accomplish it while developing the resources of the country and making public improvements. The detailed examination of Philippine revenues given in an earlier chapter shows clearly that the archipelago will be easily capable of maintaining itself. It has also a large public domain which will be of great value when the building of railroads and the making of highways render it accessible.”\*

I also argued against the assimilation of the customs duties and internal-revenue taxes of the Philippine Islands to those of the United States:

“It has been the practice hitherto to assimilate the customs duties of new territories to those of the United States. But, as already shown, this practice rests only on convenience and expediency; it is not a requirement of the constitution, which calls only for uniformity of duties, imposts, and excises throughout the States. The Commission has, however, carefully considered the feasibility of assimilating the tariff of the Philippines to that of the United States. The differences, however, appear to be fundamental and irreconcilable; the tariffs are as far apart as the corresponding economic, industrial, and social conditions of the two countries. . . . And so long as the existing chasm remains between the economic and social conditions of the Philippines and those of the United States, so long will it remain impracticable to identify their tariffs. These conditions are not more fatal to uniformity of protective tariffs

\* Report. Vol. I., p. 118.

than to uniformity of revenue tariffs; for they make it equally impossible to devise a uniform dutiable list of revenue-producing commodities. Accordingly the Commission recommends that at the present time no attempt be made to assimilate the customs duties of the Philippines to those of the United States. A similar recommendation, and for similar reasons, is also made in regard to the internal-revenue taxes of the two countries."\*

But, after all, it is men that make good and bad governments. If, therefore, honest and capable administrators are not secured and retained in office in the Philippine Islands, the best scheme of government is bound to miscarry. The Commission felt, therefore, the greatest anxiety in regard to the civil service of the Philippines. We recognized that the patronage or spoils system would prove absolutely fatal to good government in this new oriental territory. Such a system is a vast handicap to any government; but the incapacity it tolerates, the extravagance it breeds, the despotism, misgovernment, and corruption in which it issues were certain, if the system were transferred by us to the Philippines, to alienate and embitter the inhabitants, and to necessitate, in consequence, large armies to keep them in subjection.

It seemed likely to aid in the establishment of the business or merit system in the Philippines if it were made known at the outset that, under the scheme of government recommended by the Commission, compar-

\* Report, pp. 116-117.



atively few positions would be open to Americans. There would be needed, first, a very small group of able Americans to act as the organizing and directing brain of the civil administration of the Philippines; and, secondly, another small group to act as supervisors of native officials. How small the number of Americans required may be inferred from British experience in India and elsewhere. British India has an area of nearly 1,000,000 square miles and a population of over 230,000,000. Yet the whole of the higher executive and judicial work in this immense area and over this enormous population is performed by 1,000 British officials with the aid of natives, or an average of one British official to every 1,000 square miles of country and to every 230,000 inhabitants. A similar work in Ceylon is discharged, with 25,000 square miles and 3,500,000 population, by seventy-one British officials. Having brought out these facts in the report, I added the following recommendation in regard to the appointment and retention of Americans in the Philippine civil service:

“ Besides the executive, administrative, and judicial heads, who cannot be selected by means of competitive examinations, there will be a small number of offices intermediate between the heads of departments and the great body of native officials, in all branches of the Government for which it will be desirable to have American incumbents. Americans who are candidates for these positions should be subjected before admission to tests of fitness in the United States. They should then be

promoted upon merit, and retained during efficiency and good behavior. In some cases it may be desirable, on account of their experience and training, to transfer men from the existing classified service to the Philippine service; and provision should be made to enable such officials to retain all their rights and privileges as classified employees. By whichever method secured, American officials in the Philippines should be offered salaries large enough to induce the most capable of their class, not only to enter and remain in the service, but to give an honest, effective, and economical administration, free from any taint of corruption. The appointment to the service of the best men available, without regard to politics, and their retention, so long as they discharge their duties satisfactorily, are, in the opinion of the Commission, indispensable principles of administration in the Philippines.”\*

As I have already said, however, it was clear to us that nearly all the offices in the Philippines ought to be filled by Filipinos themselves. And it was the opinion of the Commission that no American should be appointed to any office in the Philippines for which a reasonably qualified Filipino could, by any possibility, be secured. As to the method of selecting and promoting natives, I wrote as follows:

“It will be necessary to institute in Manila a civil-service board, or commission, analogous to that which exists in many of the States of the Union, whose duty it shall be to ascertain, by competitive examinations of a very practical character, the relative qualifications of

\* Report. Vol. I., p. 114.

the Filipinos who seek admission to the public service. The primary demand will be for honesty and integrity; then for intelligence, capacity, and technical aptitude, or skill to perform the duties of the office to be filled. The competitive examinations will secure the selection of the fittest candidate, while it offers equal opportunities to all; and though it will be a novelty to the Filipinos, who have been accustomed only to the patronage or spoils system of appointment, it cannot fail to commend to them a republican form of government, whose civil service is regulated by justice to all applicants for admission and directed solely to the welfare of the community.

“In the Philippine civil service there should be, besides provisions for tests of fitness before appointment, regulations to insure promotion upon merit and a tenure of office during efficiency and good behavior. It would be peculiarly detrimental to the public service in a territory circumstanced like the Philippines if, on political ground, natives were liable to removal from office as soon as they had learned its duties. However it be in the United States, it is absolutely essential to good government in the Philippines that the natives should hold office during efficiency and good behavior.”\*

The hope for the future of the Philippines is in education. The majority of the Philippine people are uneducated and very ignorant. But they have a high appreciation of education and a strong desire to have their children instructed. They feel that in a generation modern education has revolutionized Japan. And a system of free schools for the people has been an im-

\* Report. Vol. I., pp. 112-113.

portant element in every Philippine programme of reform. And so, along with the merit system of civil service, the last recommendation in our plan of government for the Philippines was this:

“So far as the finances of the Philippines permit, public education should be promptly established, and when established, made free to all. \* \* \* English should be taught in the schools of the archipelago to the utmost extent feasible.” \*

I conceived an exceedingly high opinion of the educated Filipinos, who, however, form a small minority—possibly ten per cent., at most—of the people. And I recognized that the popular tendency to admire and almost worship their educated men rendered these favored individuals the natural leaders of the people. To meet them in a sympathetic and appreciative spirit, to satisfy their natural aspirations and ambitions, and to enlist them actively in the support of American sovereignty seemed to me the most important object for American authorities in the Philippines. For myself I can say, with all sincerity, that to have met and known these educated Filipinos, to have had social intercourse and official relations with them, I count one of the pleasantest and most interesting recollections in my life. I described them, and indicated the service they might render us in the establishment of civil government in the Philippines, in the following terms:

\* Report, p. 121, p. 114.



“The educated Filipinos, though constituting a minority, are far more numerous than is generally supposed, and are scattered all over the archipelago; and the Commission desires to bear the strongest testimony to the high range of their intelligence, and not only to their intellectual training, but also to their social refinement, as well as to the grace and charm of their personal character. These educated Filipinos, in a word, are the equals of the men one meets in similar vocations—law, medicine, business, etc.—in Europe or America. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that these picked Filipinos will be of infinite value to the United States in the work of establishing and maintaining civil government throughout the archipelago. As leaders of the people, they must be the chief agents in securing their people’s loyal obedience to the new government, to which, therefore, the dictates of policy, as well as plain common sense and justice, require us to secure their own cordial attachment. And it has been a leading motive with the Commission in devising a form of government for the Philippines to frame one which, to the utmost extent possible, shall satisfy the views and aspirations of educated Filipinos. They believe that the territorial system herein set forth will accomplish that object.”\*

### THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES.

But I have already lingered long enough over the past. Much has happened in the two years since the first Philippine Commission presented its report. General MacArthur and General Chaffee have conquered

\* Report. Vol. I., p. 120.

peace throughout almost all the islands and provinces of the archipelago. Judge Taft and his colleagues of the second Philippine Commission have done excellent work in the establishment and administration of civil institutions. And we of the first Philippine Commission have had the satisfaction of seeing the policies we recommended in regard to that *terra incognita* which we were the first civilian officials to investigate, largely adopted by the American people and put in operation by our successors. For the American people have rejected the programme of immediate Philippine independence under an American protectorate; civil government has been established in all the pacified regions of the archipelago; the creation of a central government, indeed, still awaits action by Congress, but provincial and municipal governments have been organized along the lines we recommended; courts of justice have been instituted; an excellent system of civil service has been adopted; and free public schools, with thousands of teachers, both Filipinos and Americans, have been opened in all the pacified provinces. Though much remains to be done, much has already been accomplished in the Philippines since the treaty of Paris brought them under the sovereignty of the United States.

There are many aspects of the Philippine question as it stands to-day, and is likely to stand in the near future. Some of the more important of these I now propose to consider. And as fundamental to all others, I begin with the military situation.

In 1899 our military forces in the Philippines were altogether inadequate to the work in hand. In 1900 and 1901, reinforcements were sent, but the improvement of conditions last spring and summer rendered it unnecessary to despatch the maximum force authorized by the act of February 2, 1901, entitled "An act to increase the efficiency of the permanent military establishment of the United States." And in his recent report, the Secretary of War states that "the army in the Philippines has been reduced since my last report from 2,367 officers and 71,727 enlisted men to 1,111 officers and 42,128 enlisted men." This force will be still further reduced through the expiration of enlistments and as a result of casualties, but the total enlisted strength will not fall below 32,079 men. A beginning has also been made in the creation of a native Philippine force, as authorized by section thirty-six of the act of February 2, 1901.

Whether these forces are sufficient for the duties assigned to them must be left to the commanding-general to decide. And General Chaffee has shown himself entirely worthy of public confidence. Having said so much, may I also be permitted to add that, in dealing with Orientals, and certainly with Filipinos, it is always economical to have far more force than the actual military undertaking demands. The surplus strength is needed not for a physical but a psychological purpose—a purpose of transcendent importance. With a superabundance of force, you impress the natives with the

plenitude of your power. Had this object been constantly kept in mind, had our army always been large enough to make an impressive exhibition of reserve strength, I have no doubt that our military task in the Philippines would have been both easier and shorter than it has actually proved.

Not that I think a large army will be necessary when the archipelago has been once completely pacified and civil government is everywhere in successful operation. We have the experience of Great Britain in Asia for our encouragement. Only a few weeks ago Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, made a visit to Upper Burma—the former dominions of King Thebaw and the Shan States—traversing with ease and safety a country in which, fifteen years ago, violence, insurrection, and brigandage were chronic and apparently ineradicable—a country, too, in which a prolonged guerilla warfare was the result of British annexation. Under the present reign of peace, order, tranquillity, and contentment, it is obvious that the military force which Great Britain maintains in those regions may be much smaller than the minimum required a dozen years ago. In the same way the military forces have already been reduced in the older British colonies in Asia. The conquest and pacification of Ceylon was a long and difficult undertaking; but to-day, in Ceylon, with 3,500,000 inhabitants, the military force numbers only 1,700 officers and men (mostly British), with a volunteer corps of 1,200 (mostly Asiatics), while the police force consists of



about 1,600 officers and men (of whom only forty-two are European). In all India, with its population of 300,000,000, the army scarcely exceeds 200,000 men, of whom only a third are British. Or take the Philippine Islands themselves before the insurrection, and we find that in 1895 Spain maintained an army of only 13,291 men, of whom only 2,210, mostly of the artillery, were Europeans, the rest being natives. Now, when the United States has dowered the Filipinos with the freest government in Asia, when prosperity has overlaid the hideous features of poverty and devastation which the insurrection has produced, it will be strange if a small military force is not sufficient to maintain order throughout the archipelago—and equally strange if the majority of the soldiers are not Filipinos. You may say this hopeful expectation is prophecy; but, if so, is it not, like scientific prophecy of natural events, a prediction based on the facts of experience under similarity of circumstances?

Meantime let us be thankful that the work of pacification draws to its conclusion. On the fourth of last July General MacArthur was able to report that

“The armed insurrection is almost entirely suppressed. At the present writing there is no embodied rebel force in all Luzon above the Pasig. In the Department of Visayas all is pacified, excepting only the island of Samar.”\*

\* Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901. Part II., p. 97.

This exception ought to have embraced Cebu and Bohol also. And with that correction it would seem that throughout all the pacified regions the insurrection was not only suppressed, but, in all probability, it was permanently extinguished, for General MacArthur had got possession of the means of war. To take Filipinos prisoners is of little account; but to capture their rifles is a real victory; for men are plentiful in the Philippines, and rifles cost money, which is very scarce. It was, therefore, a most pregnant achievement that General MacArthur chronicled when he said that

“The American army has, up to date, secured some 23,000 guns, and, in all probability, will secure several thousand more.”\*

The last report of the Taft Commission, which comes down to October 1, 1901, confirms the earlier report and hopeful forecast of General MacArthur. In the Visayas it is true Bohol and Cebu have, on account of insurgent activities, been since turned back by the civil to the military authorities. But the province of Batangas, with the adjacent part of Tayabas and Laguna, is the only portion of Southern Luzon in which the insurrection still lingers, though there are insurgents in the sparsely settled and unexplored neighboring island of Mindoro. Not only has Aguinaldo been captured, but Tinio, Trias, Cailles, and Belarmino have surrendered; and of all the prominent insurgent leaders there remain

\* Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901. Part II., p. 103.

only Malvar, the military boss of Southern Luzon, and Lukban, who, since 1898, if not longer, has been the absolute despot of the remote, turbulent, and always more or less independent island of Samar.

Those Visayan Islands—Samar, Cebu, and Bohol—have an entire population of nearly 1,000,000; Batangas has about 300,000; and, perhaps, it would be fair to allow from 200,000 to 400,000 for the parts of Laguna, Tayabas, and Mindoro which are affected by the disturbances centring in Batangas. You see, then, the military situation. There is still fighting in provinces inhabited by 1,500,000 or 1,750,000 people; there is peace in the remainder of the archipelago inhabited by 6,500,000 people.\* The pacified regions have an area of over 100,000 square miles; the area of insurrectionary depredations does not exceed 15,000 or 20,000 square miles. I acknowledge, however, that we are always liable to trouble in the great island of Mindanao (which is almost as large as Luzon), and in Palawan, about both of which we know very little; but at present the Mohammedan and heathen tribes in those islands are quiet. The Taft Commission, therefore, feels justified in reporting that

“Outside of the five provinces named [Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Batangas, and probably Mindoro] there is peace in the remainder of the archipelago. All insurrectos have surrendered, and in most of the provinces, except

\* On the old assumption that the population is about 8,000,000. The latest figures are lower, about 7,000,000.

among the Lake Moros, it is entirely safe during the day for travellers unattended to go from one town to another.”\*

May this *pax Americana* become complete and universal throughout the archipelago!

Let us turn from the military to the civil situation of the Philippines. The first Philippine Commission recommended, as I have already said, that municipal governments should be created in the Philippine Islands with powers and functions similar to those enjoyed by municipalities in the United States; that the municipal authority should be exercised by officers elected by the residents of the municipality under the restriction of a moderate property or educational qualification; and that these municipal authorities should be subject to such supervision and control, on the part of American officials, as was implied in that idea of “intervention” which the Filipinos regard as a universal and necessary axiom of government. These recommendations were substantially adopted by President McKinley and embodied in his instructions to the Taft Commission. The latter, accordingly, passed a law of this tenor in January, 1901, for the organization of municipal governments in the Philippines. Under this so-called “municipal code” 765 municipal governments have been organized.

Apart from certain persons who, prior to the capture of Manila, had held certain municipal offices, the quali-

\* Report of the Taft Commission, 1901, p. 8.



fied electors are persons who own real property to the value of \$250, or who pay an annual tax of \$15, or who speak, read, and write English or Spanish. Out of a population of 1,000 souls these restrictions yield, on the average, not more than nineteen qualified voters. But the diffusion of education now in progress, and the growth in prosperity which will follow upon the return of the insurgent Filipinos to the ways of peace and industry, may be expected gradually to enlarge the electorate. When this latter condition has been realized, when peace and industry take the place of fighting and brigandage, it will undoubtedly be safe to lower the qualifications for voting.

For my own part, I should like to see the amount of property and taxation which now qualify for municipal suffrage reduced. And, as acquaintance with a foreign language is only one test of knowledge and intelligence, and as it is a test which it is unfair to apply to a whole race who have little or no need to use foreign languages, I trust that some more equitable and adequate educational standard may hereafter be devised. Why not a successful examination in arithmetic, geography, and history—the examination to be conducted in the vernacular of the native? How many Americans, I wonder, would enjoy the suffrage, if the condition of admittance were a reading, writing, and speaking knowledge of Spanish, or even of French or German? Why should we expect more of the Filipinos than we ourselves could fulfil? And, in any case, is Spanish better for them than

Tagalog, or Visayan, or Ilocano, or Vicol, which they acquire with their mothers' milk? As to English, which will be indispensable for the politicians at Manila and the traders there and elsewhere, does any reasonable man suppose that the Philippine peoples in general can be induced to forget their own vernaculars (which come, as it were, by nature) and laboriously and painfully acquire English which the masses will never have occasion to employ? Such an illusion defies not only the psychology of language, but the lessons of history. Why, English experience in Quebec and Spanish experience in the Philippines, to go no farther afield, should dispel such a fancy. All history teaches that no race or people ever abandons its vernacular.

The municipal officers are subject to supervision on the part of the provincial governments. These provincial governments were organized, pursuant to the President's instructions to the Taft Commission, which were based on the recommendations of the first Philippine Commission, under an act passed by the Commission in February, 1901. After some changes, thirty-two of them are still in full operation. The scheme of organization provides for an elective governor—a Filipino—and an appointive treasurer and supervisor—Americans—who together constitute the governing board of the province, along with an appointive prosecuting attorney or fiscal and a secretary who have uniformly been Filipinos. It is the function of this provincial government to collect provincial and also municipal taxes; to con-

struct highways, bridges, and public buildings; and to supervise the officers of the several municipalities in the discharge of their duties. As the majority of the governing board are Americans, ultimate control is in American hands.

I have already said more than once that, however objectionable this plan is to us, it accords with the Philippine political maxim of "intervention" on the part of the sovereign power for the regulation and control of the subordinate governmental corporations. This is the point, however, at which the education of the Filipinos in the use of free institutions and the practice of self-government should be taken vigorously in hand. They should, by degrees, be trained to the point of assuming entire responsibility for their own municipal and provincial affairs. The machinery of provincial government now established, which follows in the main the features of the Spanish system to which the Filipinos were accustomed, would, by the slight change of making the treasurer an elective officer, devolve upon the inhabitants of the several provinces full control of their municipal and provincial governments, while yet retaining in the governing board the presence of an American supervisor who could give them the benefit of American experience and exert a moral influence that might be almost as effective as control. Even if these local governments should make mistakes, even if the officials sometimes squander, or even embezzle, local funds, they must eventually be encouraged to take control of their own

local affairs, for in no other way can they practise the art or form the habit of self-government which it is the high mission of the United States to teach them. Not power in the government, but liberty and independence in the people, is what every genuine republic endeavors to secure.

I am not suggesting that these changes should be made immediately. Nor should they be made at any time without the concurrence of Governor Taft and his colleagues in the administration, or whosoever may then represent American authority in the Philippines. But I am pointing out the lines along which independent self-government may be developed among the Filipinos, and must be developed if we are true to the spirit and ideals of our own republic. I am by no means, however, dissatisfied with the progress already made. There is no occasion even for impatience. It is surely a creditable showing that out of a total population of 8,000,000 Filipinos, Christian and non-Christian, about 5,000,000 have already received civil government and are now, subject to American inspection and control, themselves administering the affairs of their own towns and provinces.

And not only this. Provision has also been made for the administration of justice by civil tribunals, in which Filipinos are well represented. There is a justice's court in each of the 765 municipalities, and all these justices of the peace are Filipinos. There is a court of first instance in each of the fourteen judicial



districts into which the archipelago has been divided, with one judge to each district, besides two for the court of first instance in the city of Manila; and of these sixteen judges at least six are Filipinos. And there is a supreme court, consisting of a chief justice and six associate justices, sitting in Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu, of whom four are Americans and three Filipinos—one of them the wise, high-minded, and capable Florentino Torres, and another, the chief justice, that model Filipino, Cayetano S. Arellano, a man of spotless integrity, a lawyer of great eminence and renown, and a gentleman of learning, culture, and the most charming refinement of life and manners.

I rejoice, too, that the merit system of civil service, recommended by the first Commission, has been introduced into the Philippines. The high ideal we set forth has not been put to shame by practice either in Washington or Manila. There is no more encouraging feature about the government of our new dependencies than the willingness of politicians to recognize that there at least public office is a public trust, and that the competitive method of ascertaining fitness should be put in operation. It has come to be well understood that none but the best men available have any chance of securing appointment in the Philippines. And the Secretary of War can make the highly creditable statement that

“No officer, high or low, has been appointed upon any one’s request, or upon any personal, social, or political consideration.”\*

\* Report (1901), p. 62.

As the first Commission pointed out, the number of offices for which Americans are needed in the Philippines is really not large. Apart from the directing heads of the administrative and judicial systems and the supervisors of native officials, there is no place for Americans in the civil administration of the islands. "Nearly all the offices," I wrote, "will, of course, be filled by Filipinos themselves."\* This declaration has been fully confirmed by subsequent practice. And a civil-service board, which our Commission recommended, provides fair and practical tests for the selection of Filipinos for office.

It will be remembered that the prompt establishment of a system of free public schools, with the fullest opportunity for instruction in English, was urgently recommended by the first Philippine Commission. Happily this policy was incorporated in the instructions given by President McKinley to the Taft Commission. And the results, short as the interval has been, amply confirm the wisdom and beneficence of the policy. About 800 American teachers are now at work in the Philippines, and about 200 more will soon be appointed. Between 3,000 and 4,000 Filipinos are employed as elementary teachers; and of these about 2,000 daily receive at least one hour of instruction in English. Not less than 150,000 children are enrolled in the free primary schools. The number of native adults receiving English instruction in evening schools conducted by American teachers

\* Report. Vol. I., p. 112.

was 10,000 in October; but at the rate of increase then exhibited, there are probably 20,000, or even 30,000, at the present time. There is a wide and enthusiastic demand for instruction in English in all parts of the archipelago; and next to that is the demand for instruction in manual training and the mechanic arts, the lack of which has hitherto so greatly retarded the progress of agriculture and other industries in the Philippines. It is another proof of the intelligence of the Filipinos that they so quickly recognize the kind of education they most need: applied science for the development of the vast natural resources of their islands, and English for use in government, and in trade and commerce.

Though the masses of the Filipinos are ignorant and uneducated, as I have often said, nothing impressed me so deeply or bespoke such happy augury for the future as the universal thirst for education, the high esteem in which knowledge was held by all classes, and the general admiration, deference, and hero-worship everywhere shown to the native who had been fortunate enough to secure an education. There is a general anticipation of the opening of a new era in which, by the aid of schools, the Philippine Islands may advance in the steps and emulate the attainments of Japan. Here is another lever to lift the Filipinos to eventual independence. Next to knowledge is the consciousness of ignorance, which stimulates its possessor to strive to learn. It is sad to reflect that there are not school-rooms enough in the Philippines, or teachers enough for the pupils

who desire to be taught. The provision which, under Spanish dominion, was made for popular education was universally inadequate; but, alas! many of the school-houses have disappeared in the havoc wrought by war. If the municipalities or the central government of the archipelago are to be allowed to incur debts for any purpose, their first bonds should be issued for school-houses. The next, I may add, should be for roads.

So far no central Philippine government has been organized. The scheme recommended by the first Commission is, with some unimportant modifications, recommended by the Taft Commission in its recent report. To these modifications I see no objection, except that I consider the reduction of the membership of the popular assembly to thirty a dubious change, especially when I recall that this assembly is to represent 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 people. In New York State, with almost the same population, and far more homogeneous, we have an Assembly of 150 members and a Senate of fifty. The second branch of the Philippine legislature need not be numerous, if it is to be appointive; but all the more reason for making the popular branch numerous enough to give adequate representation to all the diversified districts and peoples of Luzon and the Visayas. I join cordially with the Taft Commission in urging Congress to enact a law for the organization of the central or general government of the Philippine Islands along the lines recommended by both Commissions.



I have described the military situation in the Philippines, and also the nature and scope of the civil administration. Let us next consider the economic conditions.

In spite of insurrectionary disturbances, business is improving in the Philippines. The imports, not including army supplies, for the fiscal year 1901 amounted to \$30,200,000, as against \$20,600,000 for the fiscal year 1900; and the exports, \$23,200,000, as against \$19,700,000. I regret to say that only a small share of this trade is with the United States: of the imports, \$2,800,000, and of the exports, \$2,500,000; and though the imports from the United States for 1901 show a large percentage of increase over those for the year 1900, the imports from England, France, Germany, and the British East Indies have increased in a still greater proportion.

Except in so far as we have maintained peace and order in the Philippines, we can make no claim to a share in the successful results achieved by the thrift and energy of individual Filipinos. Of course without tranquillity and without law, business is impossible. The improvement of business in the Philippines is at least confirmatory evidence of the progress of pacification and effective administration. But our Government is fairly chargeable with having left undone nearly everything else which a government ought to do for the development of trade and commerce in the archipelago. In the only Philippine legislation which Congress has

yet enacted, not only was no provision made for erecting in the Philippines those public agencies and instrumentalities which in the modern world are absolutely essential to production, transportation, and exchange, but there is a specific injunction against the sale or lease of public lands, timber, and mines, and a practical inhibition of the granting of franchises. If you throttle business, you need not be astonished at its sluggish and meagre life. Under the conditions, the surprising thing is that business has so markedly recovered in the Philippines during the past year. Of course the real explanation is the abysmal depths of depression to which it had sunk during the years of general strife and rapine. A big percentage of improvement may really signify only a cessation of total paralysis.

Congress must find time to consider the question of economic conditions in the Philippines. With the public lands, forests, and mines all sealed up; with a practical prohibition of commercial railroads, street-railways, electric light, telephone, and other municipal franchises; with no right in any municipality, province, or island to issue bonds for the purpose of making improvements in schools, roads, water supply, and other objects of prime public importance; with all the inconvenience, losses, and injustice of an unstable currency; with no American bank and no power to incorporate legitimate business concerns;—surely we may invoke Congress in the name of common sense, in the name of justice, in the name of humanity, in the name of the unhappy Fili-

pinos of whose misery they are the passive abettors, not to close the present session without legislation on all those subjects which affect so vitally the economic welfare of the Filipinos, the progress of their industries and commerce, and the development of the rich natural resources of their archipelago.

In the report of the Secretary of War, in the report of the Philippine Commission, in Mr. Conant's special report on coinage and banking, you may find all the information you are likely to desire on these economic and financial problems in the Philippines. Bills will undoubtedly be drafted by experts in the several fields, and the special committees of Congress may be trusted to thrash them out. The moment is opportune for dispassionate and scientific legislation on economic and financial subjects. I look for wise and statesman-like measures.

Leaving details to the wisdom of Congress—and in any event there is no time to discuss them at present—I desire to call attention to one feature of the situation which, in my judgment, is of vital importance. It does not affect those measures which Congress may itself enact, like banking and currency bills; it has reference to the exercise of the powers which Congress may grant to the Philippine government. The Taft Commission has asked that authority be conferred upon it by Congress to issue bonds; to grant municipal franchises; to pass a general public-land law; to make laws and regulations in regard to mines and forests; to pass a general

incorporation law, and to "issue charters to commercial railroads, with power to make donations of lands, or guarantee the interest on the investments, or both."\* These objects are all desirable, and some of them indispensable, to the prosperity of the Filipinos. Whether any of them should be handled by Congress directly, I shall not venture to discuss. But if they are turned over by Congress to the discretion of the Philippine Government, I submit that the delegation of power should be accompanied by a restriction, which, to my way of thinking, is all essential. Let me briefly explain.

The Taft Commission, as I have already said, concurs with the first Philippine Commission in recommending the establishment of a central government for the Philippine Islands in which there shall be a legislature consisting of an upper house, in which the members (who are to be both Filipinos and Americans) shall be partly or wholly appointed by the President of the United States, and a lower house, whose members shall be elected by the Filipinos themselves. But in recommending Congress to enact a law for the establishment of this central government, they request that it go into operation on January 1, 1904. Now as the several grants of power for which the Commission petitions Congress, taken collectively, have to do with the weightiest and most far-reaching subjects which for many years to come can engage the attention of any government at

\* Report (1901), pp. 149-150.



Manila, I submit that these powers, if now delegated by Congress, should not be exercised till the Filipinos themselves enjoy, through their popular assembly, an equal share in the legislative deliberations and an equal voice in the legislative decisions. I should, indeed, greatly regret the postponement of these beneficent economic measures till 1904; but, however grievous the delay, it would be infinitely better than to ignore, and, by ignoring, to belittle the popular assembly of Filipinos, who, in 1904, are to become co-ordinate and co-equal legislators with the members of the Commission. But another solution is at hand. Why not have the central government for the archipelago, which the first and the second Philippine Commissions agree in recommending, begin at an earlier date, say in 1902? As to the exact time, it might be on July 4th; or, if the Filipinos prefer, on December 30th, the anniversary of the martyrdom of their scholar patriot, Rizal.

At any rate, I am perfectly clear on the main point. Either the powers requested by the Commission should not (if granted) be exercised before January 1, 1904, when the Filipinos will be represented in a popular assembly, which is to be an organic part of the government; or if the powers are to be exercised earlier, the inauguration of the new government should be moved forward to the same date. The Philippines are for the Filipinos. We have no right to vote away their public property and franchises without their joint consent. If Filipinos, as legislators and administrators, are to join

us in the government of the archipelago, why should the weightiest and most important business be disposed of before their admittance? And if we are to train them up in the ways of self-government, where shall we find more stimulating and more sobering tasks to set them for their first lessons?

There is still another reason why Americans should have the co-operation of Philippine legislators and administrators in dealing with Philippine public property and franchises. They would in this way avail themselves of popular sentiment, of local knowledge and circumstances which it is impossible for Americans otherwise to ascertain. Take, for example, the subject of railroads. The Commission recommends the construction of 1,000 miles in Luzon, and probably 500 in Mindanao. Yet, in that connection, they state, very truly, that "the island of Mindanao, with an area of something more than 36,000 square miles, except along its littoral, is practically terra incognita." \* Now, the Christian Filipinos who live on the sea-coast are likely to know more of the conditions which prevail among the Mohammedan and heathen tribes in the vast interior than anybody else. They, with the Jesuit missionaries, must instruct the Philippine government in regard to that "practically terra incognita." But until they have been heard, until the subject has been thoroughly discussed by Filipinos in their popular assembly, who can tell whether 500 miles of railway in Mindanao

\* P. 62.

would pay operating expenses in the next five or fifty years?

Nor can the American authorities afford to neglect the wisdom and the sentiment of the duly elected representatives of the Filipinos in fields better known than Mindanao. The Commission recommends 1,000 miles of railway for the island of Luzon, which at present has one railway about 100 miles in length extending northward from Manila to Dagupan. Now, in the great multiplication of railways contemplated by the Commission, there is a line from Dagupan on the coast to Benguet in the mountains, which, though only fifty-five miles in length, will, of necessity, be very difficult and expensive to construct. Are there any communities of Filipinos who desire this railroad? So far as appears, it is for the sole benefit of Americans. This road would afford convenient access "to the highlands of Benguet, in which," says the Commission, "it is hoped and believed ultimately the sanitarium of the Philippines will be located."\* Sanitarium, for whom? Of course for American officials who find the climate of Manila and other Philippine towns oppressive and intolerable for certain portions of the year. And as a railroad cannot be constructed in a day, the Commission has already started a highway. "The only road," according to the report, "which has been put in course of construction under the immediate direction of the Commission is that extending from the town of Pozorubio to the town of Baguio,

\* Report (1901), p. 72.

in the province of Benguet.” \* Now, a sanitarium for American officials in the mountains of Benguet is a very desirable object; if their stay is to be prolonged in the Philippines, such a sanitarium might even be described as a hygienic necessity. And, in that case, who can doubt the expediency of railway extension to Benguet? But, when all that is conceded—and I concede it fully—I hold that American authorities have no right to vote Philippine money or credit for this object without the consent of the representatives of the Philippine people.

So far, I have said nothing of the Philippine tariff or of American duties on Philippine merchandise imported into the United States. The latter is likely to receive a good deal of attention from Congress and the American people within the next few months, or even weeks. The former, to judge from the reports of the Secretary of War and the Philippine Commission, has been satisfactorily disposed of; though I think that there should be some official assurance that our open-door policy in the Orient has been maintained in spirit as well as in letter by the new tariff bill which went into operation in the Philippines on November 15th. I should like to be officially assured that all nations have been treated alike in the trade and commerce of the Philippines, as we insist they shall be in the trade and commerce of China; that no schedules have been lowered for the advantage of the United States or raised to the detriment

\* Report (1901), p. 72.



of other nations; and that the welfare of the Filipinos alone has dictated the terms of the tariff, and that it grants absolutely equal trading privileges to all the nations of the world.

Since the recent decision of the Supreme Court, it has become necessary for Congress to pass a law fixing the duties on merchandise coming from the Philippine Islands into the United States. The bill which has already passed the House of Representatives levies our Dingley rates upon these imports. In that respect it treats the Philippine Islands like the rest of the world. But this severe justice is also tempered with charity; for the bill provides that all duties collected in the United States on imports from the Philippine Islands shall be turned over to the Philippine treasury for the benefit of the government of the archipelago. Some of you will recall that when, two years ago, it was first proposed by Congress to apply the Dingley rates to merchandise imported from Porto Rico, I publicly criticised the measure, on the ground that it violated the promise of free trade which the commanding-general made to Porto Rico, when it not only surrendered, but welcomed the American troops to its shores. And you will also recall that in a speech on Cuban affairs which I delivered here, after returning from a visit to the island last spring, I advocated, on high grounds of policy and humanity, the reduction of the Dingley rates on Cuban sugar and tobacco coming to the United States. If Cuba is, as I devoutly hope, to enjoy freer trade with the

United States, if Porto Rican exports now enter our markets absolutely free of duty, surely we shall not deny to our impoverished wards in the Orient that reduction of at least fifty per cent. of the Dingley rates on Philippine tobacco, hemp, sugar, and other merchandise coming to the United States which the Philippine Commission so wisely recommend in their report.

Such a concession is at once in the interest of the United States and in the interest of the Philippine Islands. The latter is self-evident. The former may not be so obvious; yet I hold it equally certain. For what are the means by which sovereign nations retain power over their dependencies? First of all, and most potent of all, there is sentiment. But sentiment presupposes community of race, language, religion, law, political and social institutions. The cementing force of sentiment you see in the connection between Australia and Great Britain. It can never operate to bind the Philippine Islands to the United States: nature and the course of human history have otherwise ordained; the different color of our skins, the different speech of our tongues, the different life we live absolutely forbid. But there is another means of retaining a dependency. This is the primitive method of physical force. It is by physical force—and physical force alone—that Germany retains her holdings in East Africa, France in Tonkin, and England in India. But this method is abhorrent to American sentiment, repugnant to American ideals, and at utter variance with American practice. Our people

would not consider such a policy for a moment; and they have effectually restrained their Government from raising armies to carry it out. Even the temporary necessity of holding and governing the Philippines by force is painful to the great majority of our people, and they tolerate it, I believe, only because they see no alternative, and somehow trust that freedom shall be the happy end of force. For a sovereign nation so embarrassed at the disparity between the policy it carries out and the ideals it cherishes there is a third method of retaining dependencies of quite peculiar value. Appeal to the self-interest of your wards and make their connection with you profitable. In this way England won the Scottish Highlanders and the French Canadians, though counteracting causes denied her success in dealing with the Celtic Catholics of Ireland and the Dutch Puritans of South Africa. In this way, if at all, we are to win the confidence and gratitude (perhaps affection is too much ever to expect) of the natives of the Philippine Islands. They must see and feel that their connection with the United States is advantageous to them. This appeal to their self-interest might even beget a kind of sentiment in our favor. But let there be no misunderstanding as to the terms of this policy. The Filipinos will never thank you for good roads, or railways, or schools, or courts of justice, or representative institutions, or an honest and effective administration of their affairs. These they will, when they get accustomed to them, take as a matter of course; it is they who pay for

them; and, if they have any comment to make, it will be that American officials in the Philippines are well paid for all the services they render; and the thought, though, perhaps, unexpressed, will visit their minds, that Filipinos themselves might govern the Philippines as well as Americans. Something else is necessary to appeal to their sense of profit and advantage. That something is a great, manifest, and ever-continuing act of generosity on the part of the United States. The abolition or sweeping reduction of our customs duties on the products of Philippine labor and skill would be just such a measure. No other field of generosity half so promising is open to us. Such a concession, though meaning little to us, would mean everything to the Filipinos. May Congress have wisdom to utilize this unique and fruitful opportunity!

Let us now dismiss the economic aspect of Philippine affairs and turn to the ecclesiastical. Under the dominion of Spain the Catholic Church was established in the Philippines and received its share of the annual revenues. Taking the normal times preceding the outbreak of the rebellion, we find in the budget of 1894-95 that out of a total Philippine revenue of somewhat over \$13,000,000 (silver), the expenditure on the Church aggregated \$1,227,000, of which something more than half was devoted to the salaries of the parochial clergy. One of the first acts of the American authorities was to separate the Church from the State, and to stop the grant of public moneys to it. That done, it might have



been supposed that no religious problem would remain to vex the Philippine government. The disestablished Catholic Church might, indeed, find difficulty in providing for the cure of the 6,500,000 Catholic souls enumerated in the church registry; but somehow undoubtedly that potent and venerable, yet ever fresh and active organization would accomplish the arduous task.

What made trouble for the government was the question of the friars. As a class, they had long been obnoxious to the people of the Philippines; and every revolutionary movement, since the insurrection in the '70's, in the province of Cavite, had been animated by hatred of the friars, and aimed at their expulsion from the islands and the confiscation of their property. The causes of this antipathy may be read in Rizal's great novel, *Noli me tangere*, which Mr. F. E. Gannett has translated into English under the title of *Friars and Filipinos*. I say nothing of the charge of immorality, which, in all probability, has been much exaggerated. It was rather, I believe, as victims of institutions that the friars acquired the hostility of the natives. They were not only Spanish, but they were the real administrators of the Spanish government in the archipelago; and the Filipinos charged them with the injustice, cruelty, and oppression in which that government issued. And, as though this were not burden enough to carry, three of the religious corporations—the Dominicans, the Augustinians, and the Recolletos—having acquired large estates in the islands, suffered attack as un-

just and oppressive landlords. The total area owned by the three orders amounts to 403,000 acres; and it throws much light on Tagalog activity in recent insurrections that nearly three-fourths of these holdings are in the Tagalog provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Manila, Bulacan, Morong, and Bataan, while not less than 121,000 acres are in the Tagalog province of Cavite, which has always been a hot-bed of rebellion.

The lands of the religious orders were confiscated by the constitution of the Philippine Republic, which was adopted in January, 1899. Already the revolutionists of 1896 and 1898 had driven from the parishes all the members of the Dominican, Augustinian, Recolletan, and Franciscan orders who acted as priests; and four-fifths of the 746 regular parishes in the archipelago were held by members of these orders. The unhappy monks suffered imprisonment and death at the hands of the insurgents; they fell a prey to mortality; they escaped to foreign lands or returned to Spain; so that of the 1,124 who were in the islands in 1896, the majority had disappeared, and only 472 remained at the close of the year 1900.

Under the constitution and laws of the United States, these expelled friars were free to return to their parishes, if the Catholic Church so decreed. And under the treaty of Paris, which protected all property rights, the lands which the Malolos constitutional convention confiscated, were once more safely vested in the Dominicans, Recolletos, and Franciscans. This was a bitter

pill for the Filipinos, who had taken up arms and shed their blood primarily with the object of expelling the friars and confiscating their property. The treaty of Paris balked them of the dearest object of their rebellion!

Of course the United States is blamed by Filipinos for permitting this defeat of the insurrectionary programme. But Church being divorced from State, it is not for us to dictate what kind of priests the Catholic Church shall send to its parishes in the Philippines. We may wish that the Spanish monks were elsewhere, and that American priests held their places in all those Philippine parishes. But, of course, officially the United States is powerless. In the matter of the property of the religious orders, however, the conditions are entirely different. And if that question is settled wisely and justly, I believe it will dispose of the other also; for what motive could the Catholic Church have in forcing Spanish monks on unwilling Philippine parishes when the property ties which now bind them to the archipelago have been equitably dissolved?

What, then, should be done with the agricultural holdings and other property of the religious orders? The government should buy them at a reasonable price and sell them to individual Filipinos. I have advocated this policy in season and out of season ever since my return from the Philippines in the fall of 1899. I have argued that the government would lose no money by this purchase and sale; and, even if it did, that the

settlement of so embarrassing a question was worth all the sacrifice that the most pessimistic critics could see in this method of adjustment. I have asserted that this is the only just and statesman-like policy. We do not want to deprive the religious orders of any property to which they hold a valid title; under the terms of the treaty of Paris, we could not if we would. But they have at least as much interest in selling as we have in buying. For the discontent of the Filipinos which we wish to allay, the disappointment which we aim to solace, are expressions of that same mental attitude which led to expulsion and persecution of the friars and confiscation of their property. The friars can never again be happy or prosperous in their estates; the Filipinos will never be contented so long as they hold them. Common sense and justice alike prescribe the course to be adopted: purchase by the government and sale in small holdings preferably to the present tenants.

In November, 1899, I first suggested this policy in the *Outlook*,\* and, as I have said, I have been proclaiming it by pen and voice with a good deal of insistency ever since. I was glad to find it recommended by the Secretary of War and the Taft Commission in their recent reports. Congress should enact it into law without further delay. Unhappily, there has been too much delay already.

\* See November 18, 1889, p. 669.



## THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

I now address myself to the most momentous question that can be raised in connection with the Philippines. It might well form the subject, not of a single address merely, but of a volume; so that I can only touch on its leading features in the remainder of the time—now far spent and already, I fear, too long—which your generous patience and close attention embolden me to-day to devote to the consideration of Philippine affairs. I allude, of course, to our future Philippine policy and the ultimate destination of the Philippines. This is a serious question, if ever there was one. It is, however, too large to discuss with brevity; yet, to omit it altogether would leave my survey of Philippine affairs a blank at the most vital point. I am well aware, however, of the difficulty of the problem, and feel the presumption of offering a solution; yet it is the duty of all good citizens to advise the public in matters of national concern which they have made a business of investigating, and as regards Philippine affairs, I am determined that whatever other criticism may be made upon me, I shall not be found wanting in either candor or courage. It seems to me that the highest act open to constructive statesmanship in America to-day is to conceive and formulate a wise Philippine policy—a policy which shall be true to the principles of our republic, accordant with the facts of the situation, definitive and permanent in its

character, and, therefore, fitted to shape and color all legislation requisite for its own gradual realization. The day of ignorant and enthusiastic ranting on the one hand and on the other of inertia and drift, of uncertain courses, of temporary expedients has gone by. The time approaches to set our Philippine compass by the fixed stars.

I take as my starting point the motives and objects with which we went into the Philippines. They were impressively voiced by President McKinley, and I have already told you how he set them forth to me three years ago. Our purpose was not selfish, it was humanitarian; it was not the vanity of self-aggrandizement, it was not the greed of power and dominion; no, no, not these, but altruism caring for the happiness of others, philanthropy relieving the Filipinos of oppression and conferring on them the blessings of liberty. This was the supreme consideration with President McKinley. It was this that touched the vein of sentiment in the American hearts that so overwhelmingly supported him. It does not matter what judgment you may, in the cooler atmosphere of 1902, pass upon that popular sentiment of the summer of 1898. You may consider it extravagant, irrational, impractical. I thought at the time that it went too far; and I publicly pointed out that while, under the Monroe Doctrine, it might become our duty to relieve American peoples from European oppression, we had no call to go into the business of rectifying the tyrannies of Asia. But the popular heart was stirred

too deeply to be stilled, and Admiral Dewey's great victory in Manila Bay had brought the Filipinos within the range of American solicitude and sympathy.

This is the first fact in the history of our relations with the Philippines. The political emancipation of the Filipinos was the controlling object with the President and people of the United States. I am, of course, aware that other and less worthy aims appealed to individual Americans and to groups of Americans. It would be strange if it were otherwise, considering how diversified human motives are apt to be. The jingo saw in the annexation of the Philippines another avenue for spread-eagleism; to Americans in the Orient it meant an accession of American influence in Asia; to the Protestant churchman it offered a new field for missionary enterprise; the exploiting capitalist was fascinated by the riches of Philippine forests, lands, and mines, which showed like "the wealth of Ormus or of Ind"; and the sensational press, still delirious from the fever of war and surfeited with the staleness of piping peace, discerned in the Philippines material for new sensations which promised to be as stirring as the excitant was remote, unknown, and dangerously explosive. All these influences, and others, were undoubtedly at work. Yet it was not these forces singly or in combination that carried the day; it was the humanitarian object of liberating the Filipinos from Spanish tyranny and bestowing upon them the boon of freedom that decided the President and people of the United States to compel

Spain to cede to us her sovereignty over the Philippine Islands.

Fortunate, indeed, that no lower motive prevailed. Any other object than the humanitarian one of carrying the gift of freedom to the Filipinos would have ended in vast and bitter disappointment, or, perhaps, even in poignant remorse. Did we need the Philippines to make our power felt in Asia? No, for we can exert the most potent national influence in all quarters of the world without owning adjacent territory, as our recent experiences in Pekin and Panama have demonstrated to the satisfaction of the most incredulous. And had we gone into the Philippines for commercial gain, when, think you, would our traders' profits have amounted to the hundreds of millions of dollars which the archipelago has already cost us? And what shall I say of the thousands of brave and generous young Americans who have lost their lives in the Philippines? No prospect of profit however assured, no wealth or advantage however colossal, could ever atone for the precious American life-blood swallowed up by the hungry soil of Luzon and the Visayas. For such a sacrifice there is only one justification. It is the discharge of duty, service in a righteous cause. If our presence in the Philippines be not justified in its purpose and intent, then our soldiers' blood is on our hands; ay, and all the blood, in that case innocent, of the Filipinos we have fought, the misery we have caused their families, and the devastation we have wrought in their homes.



This awful responsibility we cannot escape either before our own consciences or at the bar of history unless we have done what we have done in the Philippines for the sake of redeeming the Filipinos from foreign oppression, saving them from domestic anarchy, and leading them into the ways of self-government and freedom—a blessing at once unmeasured and immeasurable. But I assert that to confer this blessing *was* the final cause of our acceptance from Spain of sovereignty over the Philippines. Nothing has happened since to alter our purpose. Indeed, all subsequent occurrences have gone to confirm the wisdom and transcendent nobility of this end and to exhibit the folly and delusion of any other end. Self-seeking ends of every sort are excluded by American policy and stultified by actual conditions in the Philippines. We are in the Philippines for the sake of the Filipinos; but while American sovereignty is to the Filipinos a great boon, to us this extension of sovereignty is not advantageous, but burdensome. Yet we shall carry the burden till they are able to relieve us, never forgetting the goal, and never renouncing the humanitarian spirit which inspired our entrance upon so difficult a task. On this fundamental point President Roosevelt is not less explicit than President McKinley. Listen to the noble and memorable words with which he met his first Congress:

“We are extremely anxious that the natives [Filipinos] shall share the power of governing themselves. We are anxious, first, for their sakes, and next, because

it relieves us of a great burden. There need not be the slightest fear of our not continuing to give them all the liberty for which they are fit. . . . We do not desire to do for the islanders merely what has elsewhere been done for tropic peoples by even the best foreign governments. We hope to do for them what has never before been done for any people of the tropics—to make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations.” \*

What does this mean but that the Filipinos are to be taught to govern themselves as Americans or Englishmen govern themselves? And is it necessary to observe that progressive liberty must, from the nature of the case, issue in sovereign independence, “after the fashion of the really free nations,” if, indeed, the Filipinos desire that boon when they have reached the stage of political enfranchisement qualifying them to assume it? President Roosevelt does not use these terms; but the goal is inevitable if you set no limit to the progressive development of liberty and self-government.

I make this implication explicit because, though the goal may be distant, I think it desirable to form a clear notion of what it really is. I say that, as it would be inconsistent with our humanitarian Philippine policy to keep the Filipinos in perpetual dependence, and as we are to grant them an ever-increasing measure of liberty and home rule, they are likely one day to become a free and sovereign people like ourselves. And I say that

\* Message of the President of the United States, Fifty-Seventh Congress, First Session, 1901.

consummation is infinitely to be preferred to their incorporation into the United States of America as a State, or even as a territory. I wish the Federal Constitution might be amended so as to provide for the perpetual exclusion of Asiatic countries from partnership in our great American Republic. But, whether the constitution be amended or left intact, I am sure it is the policy of the American people to admit no Asiatic country to the status and privileges of a State or territory in this Republic of the United States of America. Consequently that independence which is the final term of progressive liberty for the Filipinos, since it cannot realize itself by incorporation in our union of American States, must, perforce, when the hour arrives, find embodiment in a separate and self-contained national organization. Thus, if you look beyond the present and the near future, you descry in the distance an independent and sovereign Philippine Republic. The watchword of progress, the key to the future of the political development of the archipelago, is neither colonialism nor federalism, but nationalism. The destiny of the Philippine Islands is not to be a State or territory in the United States of America, but a daughter republic of ours—a new birth of liberty on the other side of the Pacific, which shall animate and energize those lovely islands of the tropical seas, and, rearing its head aloft, stand as a monument of progress and a beacon of hope to all the oppressed and benighted millions of the Asiatic continent.

I say you will never consent to make the Philippine Islands an integral and organic part of the United States of America. No political party will ever propose so insane a programme; no statesman will ever venture to advocate a policy so repugnant to American sentiment. The case needs no arguing. The objections to the plan are insuperable; the reasons against it invincible; the hostility to it ingrained and ineradicable. The grounds of this antipathetic attitude are fundamental and all-embracing; they are physical, physiological, ethnological, historical, psychological, social, and political. Every aspect of human existence enters its protest against a union so unnatural and so unwise.

Very well; what then? A colony, a dependency? For a time, this status may suffice; as a permanent arrangement, it is impossible. For you propose to dower the Filipinos with an ever-increasing measure of liberty; but liberty grows by what it feeds on, and moves rapidly to its goal, which is independence. Then, too, the Filipinos have condensed the experience of centuries into these last half dozen years. They have dreamed of liberty; they have fought for liberty; they have seen in the east the star of independence. These are facts as potent as any other—and deeper than most—in the life of nations. The true historian recognizes them and appraises them at their just value. Listen to the language of the historian of the English people:

“I begin to see that there may be a truer wisdom in the ‘humanitarianism’ of Gladstone than in the purely



political view of Disraeli. The sympathy of peoples with peoples, the sense of a common humanity between nations, the aspirations of nationalities after freedom and independence, *are* real political forces; and it is just because Gladstone owns them as forces, and Disraeli disowns them, that the one has been on the right side and the other on the wrong in parallel questions such as the upbuilding of Germany and Italy. I think it will be so in this upbuilding of the Selave.”\*

These words were uttered in 1877, when Tory England was opposing the legitimate aspirations of the Selaves and of Russia. But here, too, as formerly, in the matter of the German and Italian nationalities, time has shown that the humanitarian Gladstone was right and his opponents wrong. As Lord Salisbury, speaking for his party, not long ago, cynically confessed, “we put our money on the wrong horse.” Sympathy with the legitimate self-assertion of other races and peoples and with aspirations after freedom and nationality gave Gladstone a political insight which the more selfish and worldly-wise politicians of his day never attained to. And what a tragic vindication his treatment of the Boers has received by the long-continued, mutually exhausting, and desolating struggle in South Africa with its assured nemesis of distrust, hatred, and racial antipathy! Gladstone saw that struggling nationalities are the jewels of history, the hope and promise of the world.

The American people have always sympathized with “the aspirations of nationalities after freedom and inde-

\* Letters of John Richard Green (1901), p. 447.

pendence." And when representative institutions have been conferred upon the Filipinos, if the people, through their regularly constituted spokesmen—which Luna, Malvar, and Lukban never were—petition for freedom and independence and show that they are capable of maintaining law and order and discharging their international obligations, can it be doubted that the American people would grant such a petition? The United States would deal as liberally with the Philippines as Great Britain with her colonies; and everybody knows that if the self-governing commonwealths of Australia and Canada to-day desired independence, they might have it for the asking. The mistake of Aguinaldo and the insurgents (so far as the insurgents were not mere brigands and robbers) was in approaching the United States with rifles instead of petitions.

From the American point of view, then, ever-increasing liberty and self-government is to be our policy toward the Filipinos; and it is the nature of such continuously expanding liberty to issue in independence. This, then, is our programme for the future, both near and remote. And I believe that while the great heart of the American people rejoices at the privilege of granting progressive liberties to the Filipinos, it throbs with still keener delight at the prospect of a day when the process shall be completed by the grant of a perfect independence. This, I say, is the necessary outcome of our policy toward the Filipinos. From the American point of view, Philippine independence is inevitable. And,

from the American point of view, Philippine independence is a consummation devoutly to be wished. Let us now see toward what goal the conditions and aspirations of the Filipinos themselves point.

In endeavoring to describe the attitude of the Filipinos to the question in hand, there is danger of permitting fancy or prejudice to take the place of scientific investigation and impartial statement. If I have erred in representing the sentiment of Americans on the Philippine question—I do not think I have, but I say if I have—my fellow-citizens are here to correct and criticise me. But who shall answer me if I misrepresent the far-off, silent Filipinos? All the more reason, therefore, for care, for accuracy, for impartiality, and for sympathy. I know that I have not myself escaped the accusation—by partisan journals, happily—of misreporting some things in the Philippines. One expects that from the bigots who, in the solitude of their own rooms, create Philippine facts to buttress their own political fabrics. But I notice that in the Philippines my reports and statements have been very differently received. For three years past I have had the satisfaction of seeing that the Filipinos feel they have been sympathetically apprehended and correctly reported by me. And only the other day I read in a Manila newspaper that of all the Americans who had gone to the Philippines, I was one of a small company—only three others were mentioned—“who had most readily succeeded in ascertaining, assimilating, and proclaiming, the opinion of

the Filipinos (*que más pronto han logrado identificarse con la opinión filipina*).”\*

I have already said enough of the heterogeneity of Philippine conditions to render it unnecessary to explain that no single off-hand formula can exhaustively answer any question relative to the inhabitants of the Philippines. And in considering the ultimate destiny of the archipelago, in endeavoring to formulate a definitive Philippine policy for the guidance of the government and people of the United States, we must first eliminate the Mohammedan and heathen tribes of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Palawan, and the smaller islands adjacent to them. Our hold on these peoples is very slight; of the interior of their islands we know nothing; our jurisdiction is confined to their waters and to a few points on their long coast lines where friendly chieftains have agreed to accept American suzerainty. Potentially these islands are ours; actually our jurisdiction is almost nominal.

Now, the few sultans and datos we have won over cannot, I suppose, be credited with much devotion to the American flag. And the sultans and datos of the innumerable tribes in the interior of those southern islands know nothing of us. Whatever policy, therefore, may be adopted by the American people as a final solution of the Philippine question, the wishes of the Mohammedan and heathen tribes are not likely to be an important factor. Of course we should not ignore their

\* *La Democracia*, Manila, October 14, 1901.



wishes. But few of them will have anything to say to us. Yet the demand which their situation makes upon the holder of sovereignty over the Philippine archipelago will have to receive very serious consideration. For example, these tribes would, in all probability, not be so quiet under an independent Philippine Republic, were one ever established, as they are under American sovereignty. Now, they are indifferent and passive; but they might easily become, what they have been in the past, aggressive, troublesome, bellicose, murderous. From what I heard from and about the Sultan of Sulu, I judge that, if American jurisdiction over the Philippines were ever to cease, he would, if he were permitted to do so, ask for a British protectorate, as his brother sultans did in the Malay States; for having visited Singapore, he has learned their history and heard of their prosperity. And where the Sulu Archipelago goes, the kindred people of Palawan are likely to go also. Whether there are enough Christian Filipinos on the coast of Mindanao to control its future is a question; but, geographically and historically, that island, which was the first on which Magellan landed, is closely connected with the Christianized islands of Luzon and the Visayas; and the Jesuits, with rare devotion and self-sacrifice, have here and there carried Christianity and civilization into the benighted interior.

I need not pursue this subject further. I have said enough to show that if, with that progressive enlargement of the liberties of the Christian Filipinos which

it is the policy of the United States to confer, they should ever attain the goal of sovereign independence, the new Philippine Republic would find itself confronted with a serious, though, perhaps, not insoluble problem in the settlement and maintenance of the status of the Mohammedan and heathen tribes of the great southern islands of the archipelago. I turn from these to Luzon and the Visayas, with the smaller adjacent islands, all of which are inhabited, with slight exceptions, by Christian Filipinos. It is these people who will decide the ultimate destiny of the Philippine Islands—these and the people of the United States, whose sentiments I have already endeavored to analyze and exhibit. What do the people of Luzon and the Visayas desire of the American people? What kind of government do they wish eventually for themselves?

I will answer these questions by quoting two passages which I wrote on that subject in the report of the first Philippine Commission. The first is this:

“There being no Philippine nation, but only a collection of different peoples, there is no general public opinion in the archipelago; but the men of property and education, who alone interest themselves in public affairs, in general recognize as indispensable American authority, guidance, and protection.”\*

It is, of course, possible to exaggerate the diversities of the Christian population of Luzon and the Visayas. It is true that the vernacular of the Tagalog is not intel-

\* Report, p. 121.

ligible to a Visayan and vice versa, and that the same is true of Vicols, Ilocanos, etc., but it must be remembered that in every town of the archipelago there are some educated men who speak Spanish, although the number in remoter places may be very small. Of course, of this class you may predicate a public opinion. And since 1899 it is possible that war, which is a great unifier, even of disparate communities, when they have a common enemy, has brought not only in every community the educated classes and the ignorant masses into a closer union, but also the different peoples themselves—Tagalogs, Visayans, Ilocanos, etc.—into relations of co-operation and sympathy, thus deepening, by universal contrast with the white man, the consciousness of community of race, and, perhaps, also developing the latent sentiment of nationality. In 1899, however, the masses of the people seemed to me indifferent to the outcome of the contest between the Tagalog insurgents we were then fighting and the forces of the United States. As one of them said to me in Cebu, they didn't care so long as they had their rice and their fish.

The second passage I have already quoted. Written in 1899, it has been verified by all that has since happened in the Philippines; and, as it is the quintessence of the political aspirations of the Filipinos, it should be the animating principle of our definitive and ultimate Philippine policy. Here it is once more:

“The Philippine Islands, even the most patriotic declare, cannot, at the present time, stand alone. They

need the tutelage and protection of the United States. But they need it, in order that, in due time, they may, in their opinion, become self-governing and independent. For it would be a misrepresentation of facts not to report that ultimate independence—independence after an undefined period of American training—is the aspiration and goal of the intelligent Filipinos who to-day so strenuously oppose the suggestion of independence at the present time.”\*

I believe, as I have said, that this is the essence of the political aspiration and opinion of intelligent Filipinos; and, as intelligent Filipinos exercise a remarkable influence over the ignorant masses of the people, this is, or will become—if, under the quickening agency of war, it has not already become—the political programme of all the Christian Filipinos of Luzon, the Visayas, and the coast of Mindanao; that is, of all Filipinos except the Mohammedan and heathen tribes, whose political situation we have already discussed. That their ultimate goal is independence there is no manner of doubt. Practically all Christian Filipinos are agreed on that point. But as regards an interval of American tutelage and training, it seems to me that a difference of opinion begins to emerge. As I read the Philippine newspapers—and I take a Manila daily—I perceive that while all recognize American tutelage as unavoidable, not all acknowledge it as good and desirable in itself, though the majority, I should guess, still consider it indispensable for a time.

\* Report, p. 83.



Here, then, is the criterion for determining the course of politics among the Filipinos. All of them, I repeat, desire independence eventually. But the process of political enfranchisement may be immediate, or at least very rapid, or it may be gradual, progressive, and of long duration. Each course will undoubtedly have its advocates; but as all Filipinos favor eventual independence, the majority, it may be predicted with safety, will embrace the policy which leads most quickly and surely to that goal. Timid men, interested men, conservative men, old men, without renouncing the goal of independence, will in the meantime prefer to endure the ills of dependence on the United States rather than to fly to the unknown ills of independence. These Filipinos will constitute the opportunist party. And opposed to them will stand the great majority of Filipinos who will agitate for immediate independence, and they will be entitled to call themselves the nationalist party. Such is the coming political alignment of Filipinos in Luzon and the Visayas, as I foresee it. All of them in favor of an independent and sovereign Philippine Republic as the final consummation of their ideals and aspirations; but in the meanwhile a small but influential opportunist party content with temporary dependence on the United States and a numerous nationalist party clamoring for immediate independence. I shall be greatly disappointed if within the next decade these tropical islands do not prove a most fruitful nursery and forcing-house of vital politics.

If, as I believe, the people of the United States stand ready to grant independence to the Filipinos when they may safely be intrusted with the use of it, and if, as I further believe, the great majority of Filipinos will agitate to procure it immediately, the only issue that can arise between them will be with reference to the time for the establishment of the Philippine Republic, which both parties agree is some day to be set up.

Those Americans, patriotic but unversed in history, who desire to recreate the Filipinos in their own similitude, will always be able to demonstrate that that oriental clay is still without shape and seemliness in the American potter's hand, and that for a perfect product, a vessel of honor and glory, the American wheel must be kept going for years, or, perhaps, for generations, or possibly even for centuries. Heaven save the Filipinos from such an impertinent and meddlesome earthly providence! The Filipinos are to develop along their own racial lines, not along ours; and it is colossal conceit and impudence to disparage them because they are different from ourselves. Capacity for independent self-government does not necessarily mean capacity like ours to administer a commonwealth like ours, but merely capacity of some sort to maintain peace and order, to uphold law, and to fulfil international obligations. It may be a matter of only a short time when the Christian Filipinos of Luzon and the Visayas will be as well qualified to discharge these functions as Mexico, Peru, Argentina, or Venezuela. And when they are so qualified, the

American Government has no further duty or business in the archipelago. Any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the best possible government of Filipinos by Americans.

For that reason, as I have already said, I am anxious to see Congress grant the Filipinos representative institutions at once. It is no argument against this policy that even educated Filipinos do not possess our conception of civil liberty or of official responsibility. With such powers, ideas, and sentiments as they have, get them in harness quickly and let them tug and sweat under the burden of national affairs. This is the way men are trained in government. Political aptitudes and political sentiments are the gift of nature and the acquisition of personal experience; they cannot be donated by one person or nation to another. And if you do not at once take the educated Filipinos into active partnership in the government of the Philippine Islands, your monopoly of power, if it does not alienate and embitter them, may have the still worse effect of tending to discourage and emasculate them. If the Filipinos are to learn to govern themselves in the manner of the really free nations, the sooner they get at it, the better. Passive acquiescence, without partnership, in American government of the Philippines will atrophy their own native capacity for self-government. In that way their dependence would mean their servitude. The beginning of all national, as of all personal, freedom is this: "Son of man, stand upon thy feet!" America

cannot endow the Filipinos with liberty; but by permitting them to govern themselves, starting now with representative institutions and gradually enlarging their powers, it can at least put them under conditions favorable to the development of liberty. To give them a good government from above without evoking their own active co-operation—as England has done for the people of India—is to sap and atrophy their own capacity for self-government.

But I have wandered from my theme, which was the attitude of Filipinos themselves toward the great question of the political future of the archipelago. I have shown, however, that the Christian Filipinos regard independence as the ultimate destiny of their country, and I have ventured to read the horoscope of coming political parties in Luzon and the Visayas. I see only two political parties, both, indeed, in accord on the fundamental subject of independence, but the one—the nationalists—proclaiming “Behold! now is the accepted time; now is the day of salvation!” and the opportunists rallying round the conservative banner with the device, “Not yet: Mañana, to-morrow.”

It is true, indeed, that for the last two or three years these tendencies have been obscured. Pacification has been the great business; and the friendly politician's platform (no other, of course, was permitted) has had that end constantly in view. I have already explained how, under assurances of liberty and self-government, the first Philippine Commission stimulated the forma-



tion of the Autonomist Party. This designation of the party accurately described it. The members of that organization accepted American sovereignty with the promise of home rule in local affairs. The issue of eventual independence was not raised. I think it would have been more fortunate had the Autonomist Party never changed their name or their programme. But, whether of their own motion or under American inspiration, they decided that it was not enough to work for the pacification of the archipelago with the aim of securing a large measure of autonomy under American sovereignty. It may be that they craved a larger independence for the Filipinos. At any rate, they adopted the new name of Federal Party and made the leading plank in their platform the declaration that "the Philippine Islands should form an integral part of the United States of America, to be organized as a territory, with all the rights and privileges which the Constitution of the United States concedes to other territories, including that of becoming in time a State of the Union."\* How seriously this programme has been taken by the members of the party is clear from the fact that at the convention where it was unanimously decided to petition Congress in that regard, I find there were present those able, prominent, and influential Filipinos (whom I am happy to call my friends) Mr. Gregorio Araneta, solicitor-general, and Messrs. Pardo de Tavera, Luzu-

\* *La Democracia*, November 4, 1901 (Draft of Petition to Congress). Of course this is the latest, not the earliest, formulation of the policy.

riaga, and Legarda, the native members of the Taft Philippine Commission.

I have already expressed my opinion that this demand for the incorporation in the United States of America of the Philippine Islands as a State, or even as a territory, is inadmissible. I need not here repeat what I have elsewhere said. Our people want America for the Americans, as, on the other hand, I recognize that the Philippines are for the Filipinos. All honor to the autonomists—I will call them federalists, if they prefer it—for the great and beneficent service which, since the formation of their party in the spring of 1899, they have rendered in the pacification of the disturbed provinces of the archipelago! But I say to them, in the frankness of an old friendship, that they are wasting their political energies and endangering their political influence in this country by advocating a measure so impracticable and impossible as the federal union of the Philippines with the United States.

So far as I can make out, this federalist plank of the Autonomists' platform rests on a double delusion. First of all, they expected the Supreme Court, in the fourteen diamond rings case, to decide that the constitution followed the flag, and that its provisions applied *ex proprio vigore* to our new Philippine annexations. Secondly, they thought that if the Philippine Islands were incorporated as an organic and integral part of the United States, the Filipinos would secure the benefits of the constitution without the intervention of congressional

legislation. In other words, it was their device in a roundabout way to secure immediate Philippine independence, if not absolutely, at least in large measure, and especially in the shape of immunity from the arbitrary and unlimited powers of Congress, of which they stood in dread. Since the decision of the Supreme Court reached the Philippines, I notice a change in the utterances of the party; they hark back to autonomy with which they began.

“The solution,” they say, “of the problem of our *immediate* future is found in the formula of autonomy, a government of our own, the participation of the Filipinos in the government of the Philippines, under the guidance and direction of America.”\*

And if you ask why they ever adopted that will-o'-the-wisp policy of federalism, they reply, in terms not complimentary to us, though exhibiting their own natural longing for independence, that they hoped in this way to escape

“special legislation for the Philippines, government of the Philippines subject to the arbitrary will of Congress without constitutional restrictions, all which involves the danger of subjecting the administration of our government to the rise and fall of [American] parties, to presidential elections, and to the rational selfishness of commercialism.”†

\* *La Democracia*, November 15, 1901. This journal is the organ of the party.

† *Ibid.*

Thus the party baffled and disillusionized goes back to the practical position of autonomy for the present, leaving the future, officially at least, undefined. If in their hearts they do not cherish the ideal and faith of national independence, I have entirely missed the implication of their successive positions. The Philippines for the Filipinos; that, I believe, is the hope and aspiration of the Autonomists and of all parties in Luzon and the Visayas. And, if I am not greatly mistaken, this is what you will hear from a popular assembly, as soon as you confer representative institutions upon the Filipinos.

As it is the policy of the United States to give the Filipinos liberty after the fashion of the really free nations, or an ever-increasing measure of home rule, which cannot but eventuate in independence, so, however clearly or however obscurely they may recognize the need in the meantime of American protection and tutelage, the ultimate goal and final aspiration of the Filipinos themselves is an independent and sovereign Philippine Republic. And, as I wrote in the report of the first Philippine Commission,

“Perhaps the most encouraging feature in the difficult problem we have undertaken in the Philippines is the perfect coincidence between the theory and practice of our government, on the one hand, and the aspirations and ideals of the Filipinos on the other.”\*

As I have already observed, since both Americans and Filipinos desire the political enfranchisement of the



Filipinos, there can be no issue between them, except in regard to the time when an independent and sovereign Philippine Republic should be established. The obstacles in the way of such an organization, even for Christian Luzon and the Visayas, which, in 1899, seemed to me the most serious, were the lack of homogeneity, union, and intercourse among the diverse peoples of these islands—Ilocanos, Tagalogs, Vicolos, Visayans, etc.—in virtue of which they appeared rather a collection of disparate communities than a single common nationality; and, secondly, the want of experience by the natives in government during three centuries of Spanish dominion, which involved not only ignorance, but, it was to be feared, an impairment of governing capacity. These, I say, appeared to me fundamental objections to the institution of a Philippine Republic immediately on the pacification of the archipelago; and in guessing—for no one could, in such a matter, do more than guess—when it might be safe and expedient to launch a native sovereign republic, I never ventured to make the interval of waiting shorter than one generation.

In view of subsequent facts and experiences, however, I think it may be not only possible, but feasible, to shorten the period of preparation and transition under American sovereignty. First of all, remember that the first Philippine Commission reported that ultimate independence (after a period of American tutelage) was the goal and aspiration of all intelligent Filipinos. Then

we have the testimony of the Taft Commission, that the native officials have proved reasonably capable in the administration of public affairs. The test we have made of the governing capacity of the Filipinos has resulted more favorably than could have been anticipated by deduction from their previous political inexperience. Nor is this all, or even the principal item. Far more important and pregnant of hope is the more or less distinct emergence, under the storm and stress of the last two or three years, of a community of attitude, interest, sentiment, and aspiration, in matters political, among all the Christian peoples of Luzon, the Visayas, and the littoral of Mindanao. Undiscoverable, or at any rate undiscerned, if it existed, in 1899, this consciousness of nationality is to-day so manifest and powerful that General Chaffee, looking at it with the eyes of a military man, has declared, or at least is reported to have declared, that the natives of these islands are all traitors to American sovereignty, all have their hearts set on independence. We know that the strife and passion of war release pent-up mental, as well as physical, energies, and bring to the light of day as realities slumbering fancies, hopes, and sentiments which, in times of peace, merely flit about the background of consciousness. Scarcely any one in the Thirteen Colonies dreamt of independence when the war against British Imperialism began. And I suppose Lecky is right in his contention that the independence they achieved was actually the work of a small and aggressive minority. It is quite conceivable,

therefore, that the restricted aspiration after immediate independence which the first Philippine Commission discerned in the Philippines (and reported), in 1899, should, after three years of fighting in all or almost all the provinces of Luzon and the Visayas, have become a universal passion animating and uniting all these diversified communities. This is all the more probable, as from the beginning the racial aspect of the case has been prominent; and, as against the white man of America, who succeeded the white man of Europe, the multifarious peoples of Luzon and the Visayas at least felt themselves Malaysians and Filipinos. I am not surprised, therefore, if to-day we have to reckon with a universal sentiment and idea of nationality among all the peoples of Luzon and the Visayas with a demand or desire for immediate independence.

But if that be the case—and General Chaffee's statement seems to confirm it as a fact—the greatest obstacle, in my judgment, to the establishment in the near future of a Philippine Republic has been removed. When I wrote, in 1899, that

“No one can foresee when the diverse peoples of the Philippine Islands may be molded together into a nationality capable of exercising all the functions of independent self-government,”\*

though I hoped for the dawning of the day within one generation (as I there intimated), I did not expect as

\* Report of First Philippine Commission, p. 103.

early as 1902 to learn from the commanding-general that, under the hammer of war and the heat of strife, the welding of these "diverse peoples" into a common nationality had been consummated.

I shall not, however, indulge in guesses as to the date when the new fabric should be reared. On that point I desire to be informed by the Filipinos themselves. And I want to hear not the voice of individuals, however prominent, but the voice of the people. There is, however, only one way of securing it. The people can speak only through the representatives they elect to a popular assembly or house of representatives. Here then is another reason why Congress should not delay granting representative institutions to the Filipinos. To secure representative institutions, they took up arms against Spain; the half million educated and propertied Filipinos who would be more immediately represented under the limited suffrage proposed, will be conservative rather than radical; and what they, and the poor and ignorant millions of their fellow-citizens for whom they speak, desire, must, in the long run, prevail in the archipelago. The United States is the last people in the world to argue any other people into political subjection. And against a whole nation aspiring and struggling to be independent, it is as impossible to-day to draw up an indictment as it was when Burke repudiated the task in connection with the people of the Thirteen American Colonies.

If the Filipinos desire independence, they should



have it, when they are qualified to exercise it. The reports of General Chaffee and Governor Taft demonstrate (whatever their own personal views) that the difficulties in the way of independence are gradually disappearing. Let a Philippine popular assembly or house of representatives say whether the Filipinos want independence or not, and if so, at what date they think the grant should be conferred, and we shall then have before us all the conditions necessary for the final solution of the Philippine problem. If it appears probable, as recent experience seems to indicate, that the Christian Filipinos of Luzon and the Visayas might, at no distant day, govern themselves as well as the average Central or South American Republic, then, in the name of American liberty and democracy, in the name of the political aspirations and ideals of the Filipinos, and in the name of justice and humanity, let the Philippine Republic be established. As President McKinley said to me three years ago, we went into the Philippines solely with the humanitarian object of conferring the blessings of liberty on the Filipinos. In its highest potency, liberty and independence are one and inseparable.

And to repeat, what ought not to need repetition anywhere within the limits of our free Republic, any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the best possible government of Filipinos by Americans.









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